Action on the Northwest Frontier - Wano, 1894. Part 1

Background

The Waziristan Delineation Escort arose from the treaty of 1893 defining the frontier between British India and Afghanistan, the "Durand Line". The region on the British side had in fact been "British" in name only, and several punitive raids had been mounted to punish Pushtan tribes for attacking Indian settlements further south. By the 1890s, the British felt strong enough to establish proper control of the area, and in 1901 the region was formed into a new province, the North West Frontier. 

Of course, it was not quite as easy as that, and in 1894 a military force was send to the Waziristan area. Unlike the previous expeditions, this mission had both political and military aspects, and therefore political and military leaders. It will probably come as no surprise that this was to cause problems. The following, from The London Gazette of June 14 1895, is the report of the military commander, Brigadier-General A. H. Turner. 

To Wano

The troops assembled at Dera Ismail, and was ready by the 1st of October. It was quite a strong, well balanced expedition, though with hindsight perhaps not strong enough.

Squadron; 1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry  129 men

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery (6 guns)                         265 men

No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners                          191 men

1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment                             748 men

3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry                                                744 men

20th Regiment of Bengal Infantry                                          740 men

(the infantry armed with Martini-Henry rifles, the cavalry with Martini-Henry carbines and lances)

Turner did not leave however until the 11th, due to "political considerations" as he rather pointedly puts it. By the 18th they had reached Kajuri Kach where they were joined by members of the Delineation Commission. On the 22nd the whole force, minus the 20th Bengals left to safeguard supplies, set out for Wano (modern day Wanna), which they reached, after extensive reconnaissance, on the 24th. They were joined by the 20th Bengals, and further supplies, on the 27th. 

The Camp at Wano

"Wano is a large open plain, for the most part stony, about 13 miles long by 11 miles broad.

The only running stream is the Toi which skirts the southern and south-eastern edge of the plain, and along the banks of which-there is a narrow strip of cultivation surrounding the villages and forts of the Ahmadzai Darweshkhel Waziris."

A camp was established on the plain, as seen below. 

 "The country in our vicinity, as indeed all over the Wano plain, is intersected by ravines in every direction. A ravine runs along the whole front and another along the rear, from which latter the drinking water is obtained. These ravines are both tributaries of the Toi which here runs from south to north, and is not more than 300 yards distant from the east end of the civil camp. Beyond the Toi rise some high hills, out of range except for arms of precision. About 400 yards in rear of the camp, is a small rocky ridge with two peaks rising some 75 feet out of the plain ; this is known as the " Picquet Hill." 

"The whole camp was surrounded by a chain of observation picquets, and the position of these and also of their supports on the night of the 2nd-3rd November is shown in the sketch. It had been found that patrolling at night was useless owing to the noise made by our men moving over the stony ground, which indicated their position, and rendered them liable to be surprised and cut off by small parties. The picquets, were posted with the object merely of observing and reporting, and were not intended to hold their own in the event of a serious attack, in which case they were ordered, after giving the alarm, to fall back on their supports, the latter then retiring on the main body. To have had all picquets strong enough to offer resistance to an attack in force would have made night duty fall very heavy.

"The positions for the picquets were chosen chiefly with the object of watching the ravines in the vicinity of the camp. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 picquets were furnished by the 3rd Sikhs. The 1st Gurkhas furnished the picquets on the left flank, viz., 8, 9, 10, the "Bogey," and 11. The " Bogey " picquet was so called because it was only occasionally held, but on the night of the 2nd-3rd it was occupied. No. 12 was furnished by the 20th Bengal Infantry and had a support in rear, on which it was ordered to fall".

 "To the north-east of. camp and about 500 yards distant, there is a deserted Danveshkhel fort, and this on the night of the 2nd-3rd was occupied by 100 rifles of the 1st Gurkhas, with orders to remain concealed, and if an attempt on camp were made in that direction, they were to attack the enemy in rear. If the attack were made on the left of camp, they were to try and cut off any body of the enemy retreating by the Toi valley.

The above brief description of our dispositions will help to explain the events that followed. It may also here be mentioned that the moon was in its first quarter and went down about ten o'clock pm the evening of the 2nd". 

 Actually there were two camps. "The civil camp was pitched separately about 100 yards to the right rear of the 3rd Sikhs. This was a source of great anxiety to me, but I consented to this arrangement on the urgent representation of the British Commissioner, who considered that it was  necessary on political grounds, as allowing free access to him by jirgas".

The siting of the camp was crucial to what was to follow, and came in for some criticism later. Turner in his report seems well aware of this, and is distinctly defensive.

" It may here be mentioned that the position of the camp had been chosen chiefly on political considerations, as the British-Commissioner had urged most strongly that the force should remain at the eastern end of the valley, so as to cover the main passes into the Mahsud country, namely, the Tiarza and the Inzar, already mentioned.  The political officers up to the end of October were fully persuaded that we need anticipate no strong combination among the Mahsuds to molest us, but that we should be prepared for raids or annoyance from small bands. The camp was therefore pitched somewhat more extended for sanitary reasons than it would have been in a purely military expedition". 

The political officers were to be proved wrong .......