The British view of the Baltic, 1919. Part 2.

June 1919 found Admiral Cowan´s First Light Cruiser Squadron of the Royal Navy based at Bjorko harbour in Finland, monitoring the Bolshevik fleet bottled up in Kronstadt. The aim was to stop it intervening in the newly independent Baltic states, or even in the German Revolution raging at the time. However, there was something of a stalemate, as Kronstadt harbour was well protected by minefields and forts covering the entrance. There was also a danger from German units to the south, supposedly there to oppose the Bolsheviks, but suspected of having an agenda of their own.

 Some of the crew of HMS Caledon

Admiral Cowan´s report, as printed in the London Gazette continues as follows.....

30. It was evident by then that the Bolshevik Active Squadron consisted of:  ...
2 Battleships. (1 Dreadnought " Petropavlovsk"), 1 Cruiser, "Oleg" and 6 Large Destroyers.
31. Up to about the end of June there were constant attempts by Enemy Light Craft to break out on the Northern side at night, and both to sweep and lay mines - and a good deal of shooting, though little hitting, went on between the Patrols - also, there is no doubt more mines were laid by the Bolsheviks, to the Southward of Stirs Point, and to the Eastward of the existing Mine Barrier.

32. On the 13th June very heavy firing broke out between Fort Krasnaya Gorka and the fort and ships at Kronstadt - Fort Krasnaya Gorka having suddenly turned over to the "Whites", who, however, were not strong enough to hold it - the forces immediately available being only a hundred or so of badly-armed and much-exhausted Ingermanlanders, who, owing to the fire from the Bolshevik Heavy Ships, were unable to occupy the Fort long enough either to effectively man the guns, or destroy them - and so, after changing hands twice, Krasnaya Gorka remained in Bolshevik hands.
33. These Ingermanlanders were fighting under the direction of the Estonian Command, and were armed and equipped by them, chiefly from supplies captured from Bolsheviks, and had done very well ever since these operations started, and were fighting with the more enthusiasm as it was their own country they were freeing.
Apparently, however, their successes aroused the suspicion and jealousy of the Russians of the Northern Corps, who, equipped and supported in every way by the Esthonians, had by then begun to become a considerable fighting force, and were holding the line on the right of the Estonian-Ingermanland Force - whose left flank rested on the sea, and had pushed forward as far as Krasnaya Gorka.

34. In order to deal with any attempt by heavy ships to break out - as well as to maintain an effective patrol on the entrance to Petrograd Bay, I considered it advisable to lay mines so as to restrict the movements of the enemy, and this was done by"'Princess Margaret" (Captain Harry H. Smyth, C.M.G.,D.S.O.) and the 20th Destroyer Flotilla (Captain Berwick Curtis, C.B., D.S.O.).
35. On 17th June our lookouts reported a Cruiser ("Oleg") and two Destroyers left anchor West of Kronstadt, and also a Submarine moving Westward.
36. A few minutes after midnight a sudden burst of firing was heard by our outpost Destroyers, which, as suddenly ceased, and next day Lieutenant Augustine W. Agar, .R.N., informed me that he had torpedoed the Cruiser "Oleg" at anchor, the torpedo hitting her about the foremost funnel, and came under heavy fire from the Destroyers on retiring.
37. On the 6th July "Vindictive" on passage from England to join me in the Gulf of Finland, ran aground outside Reyal on the Middle Ground Shoal, and remained there for eight days. It was a time of some anxiety to me, as she was going fifteen knots at the time of striking, and had slid up half her length, and was in two feet six inches to three feet less water there than her draught, and in a tideless sea. " Delhi" and "Cleopatra" made several ineffectual attempts to tow her off before after lightening her by 2,212 tons, and experiencing a rise of water of about four to six inches due to a Westerly wind, "Cleopatra' at last pulled her clear after eight days of effort and, as we discovered shortly afterwards, all the towing operations were carried out in the middle of a minefield.

 Recovering a plane after a bombing raid

38. Early in July strong attacks were made by the Bolsheviks on the Russian front on the Southerly shore, necessitating frequent bombardments by light Cruisers and destroyers of the Bolshevik positions. Bolshevik aircraft were also active; Fort Krasuaya Gorka also occasionally firing at our patrol in Kaporia Bay.
39. Later in the mouth our Flying Operations started, consisting at first of reconnaissance and photographic flights, and then on the morning of the 30th July a bombing operation against the ships in Kronstadt, the main objective being a Destroyer Depot Ship with five or six Destroyers lying alongside her. The whole was under the command of Squadron Leader David G. Donald, A.F.C., R.A.F.
Sixteen bombs in all were dropped, and one hit, at any rate, was registered on the Depot Ship, which disappeared from her accustomed position in the harbour, and was not seen again. All machines returned safely after passing through a heavy anti-aircraft fire from the ships and batteries defending Kronstadt.
40. Thereafter continued a close watch on Petrograd Bay, with frequent bombardments by us of Bolshevik positions on the Southern Shore, and occasional shellings by Fort Krasnaya Gorka and other guns, varied by attacks by enemy submarines on our vessels, and intermittent activity by Bolshevik Destroyers and Minesweepers, with occasional appearances outside the harbour by larger craft.

41. On the morning of 18th August, with the object of removing, as far as possible, the threat which existed to my ships and also to the Left Flank of the Russian advance to Petrograd by the presence of the Bolshevik Active Squadron, an attack on the ships in Krronstadt by Coastal Motor Boats and Aircraft was made.
42. The position of the ships in the harbour had been ascertained by aerial photographs. Frequent bombing raids on the harbour had also been made at varying times in the weeks beforehand.
43. The attack was planned so that all available aircraft co-operated under Squadron Leader D. G. Donald, A.F.C., R.A.F., and that they should arrive and bomb the harbour so as to drown the noise of the approach of the Coastal Motor Boats.
44. The time-table was most accurately carried out; with, the result that the first three Coastal Motor Boats, under Commander Claude C. Dobson, D.S.O., passed the line of Forts and entered the harbour with scarcely a shot being fired.
45. Each boat had a definite objective - six in all. Of these six enterprises four were achieved, the results being gained not only by dauntless disciplined bravery at the moment of attack, but by strict attention to said rehearsal of, every detail beforehand by every member of the personnel, both of the boats and also of the Air Force;
46. Of the latter there is this, to say, that though all their arrangements for bombing were makeshift, and their aerodrome, from which the land machines had to rise in the dark, was a month before a wilderness of trees and rocks, and in size is quite inadequate, not one of the machines (sea and land) failed to keep to its time-table, or to lend the utmost and most effective support during, and after, the attack to the Coastal Motor Boats.
47. After this nothing bigger than a Destroyer ever moved again, but a certain amount of mine-laying and sweeping was observed near the approaches to the harbour.

 The wreck of the Pamiet Azov in Kronstadt harbour

48. During (September) our ships constantly bombarded Bolshevik positions on the Southern Shore in Kaporia, Bay, in support of the Esthomian Left Flank, whilst the aircraft were employed in bombing Kronstadt and attacking their small craft whenever seen.

49. Early in October the long talked of advance against Petrograd by General Yudenifcch began - but as his left flank was not made secure by making the capture of Forts Erasnaya Gorka and Saraia Lochad his first objective - as was repeatedly urged - the attempt failed.
50. The Esthonians, so long as their advance was such that the guns of the light cruisers and destroyers of the Biorko Force could support them, went forward - but thereafter they met with strong and effective resistance and much barbed wire, and were held up within four miles of the land approaches to Fort Krasnaya Gorka and suffered very heavy losses - equal to nearly one-third of their forces, which did not at the beginning exceed two thousand men.
51. It was after this check that "Erebus" (Captain John A. Moreton, D.S.O.) arrived (24th October), which encouraged Admiral Pitka, who was in command of the Esthonian Forces, to try again; but by then the Russians had begun to fall back, thereby uncovering the Esthonian right flank and causing them further distress, and dispersion of their few remaining effectives.
The Russians and Esthonians then fell back with considerable rapidity as far west as the line Narva - Peipus Lake, and I devoted myself to endeavouring to ensure that, from the sea, no further attempt was made to further harass these very war-weary and dispirited troops.
52. Unfortunately the "Erebus" (Captain John A. Moreton, D.S.O.) arrived only after the attempt was doomed to failure, and by that time also the weather had broken, making it very unsuitable for flying in order to direct the firing of "Erebus" ; also our machines and many of the pilots were, from hard service through the summer, rather past their best. The type of machine, too (Short Seaplane), was unable to get sufficient height to avoid the very severe and accurate anti-aircraft fire from these two forts.
53. All that could be done by our ships (light cruisers and destroyers) besides "Erebus" in the way of shelling positions and covering the advance, was done, and always within the range of Fort Krasnaya's Gorka's twelve-inch guns, and under the observation of its kite balloon; although they have constantly shelled us, have never succeeded further than to land a few splinters on board.

54. On the 30th October arrived, out from England General Sir Richard Haking and a small staff of officers, who, after investigating and acquiring what appeared to ine to be a very complete grasp of the whole Baltic situation and its needs, returned to England after two weeks.

55. Towards the beginning of October and concurrently with the attempt on Petrograd by the Russian North-West Army, the German- Russian threat against Riga became acute, and a bombardment of the town commenced. "Abdiel " (Captain Berwick Curtis, C.B., D.S.O.) and " Vanoc " (Commander Edward O. Tudor, R.N.) were there at the time, also a French destroyer ("L'Aisne"), "Dragon" (Captain Francis A. Marten, C.M.G., C.V.O.) was on her way out from England and I therefore diverted her there.

Prince Avaloff Bermont

56. Owing to the situation in the Gulf of Finland and the necessity of supporting the advance of the Esthonians on the left flank of the Russian Army, I was unable to leave those waters myself, and so requested Commodore Brisson, the French Senior Naval Officer, who had by then proceeded to Riga, to take charge of the operations there, and to open fire on all positions within range on the the left bank of the Dvina River, at the expiration of the time given in my ultimatum to Prince Avaloff Bermont, who was ostensibly in command of the troops occupying those positions, and attacking Riga.
57. This Commodore Brisson most faithfully and effectively did at noon on the 15th October, apparently much to the surprise of Bermont, who had, in reply to my ultimatum, stated that he was friendly to the Allies and was only resisting Bolshevism, and disowned all connection with the Germans, and whose forces, were in position and with little shelter, in some places less than one thousand yards from ours, and the French ships, Bermont having evidently assumed that his statements and .arguments were sufficient to hoodwink me and delay our offensive action.
58. This enabled the Lettish troops to cross the river in strength and with great enthusiasm after twenty-six days fighting, to sweep away all these Russo-Germah forces from within striking distance of Riga and out of Mitau - which had been the German main base and headquarters throughout the year - Tukkum and the Windau district.
59. On about the 30th October the threat to.Libau by German troops became serious, and I sent directions to Captain Lawrence L. Dundas, C.M.G., the senior naval officer there, to, with the help of the British Military Mission, get into co-operation with the Lettish Defence Forces, establish communications and observation posts and plot targets, and sent ''Dauntless" (Captain Cecil Horace Pilcher) down from Biorko to reinforce, and shortly afterwards "Erebus" also, as by this time General Yudenitch was falling back from before Petrograd, and therefore the need for bombarding Fort Krasnaya Gorka had ceased.
60. On the 14th October a very heavy attack on Libau commenced and the Germans succeeded in occupying the outer fixed defences of the town, but after eight hours hard fighting by the Lettish troops and incessant bombardment by the British ships they were thrown, back again with very heavy losses.
61. The ammunition question at the end of this day was of some anxiety to me, two vessels having fired the whole of their outfits and other being very short. An ammunition ship was on her way down from Riga at the moment—" Galatea," homeward bound .with General Sir R. Haking. on board, and also two destroyers were in the vicinity, so all were ordered in to replenish the Libau force with their ammunition. No further attack of any weight however was made, and the crisis passed.
62. With regard to these two attacks on Riga, and Libau, it is unquestionable that the German intention was to frustrate by every means in their power any successful attack on Petrograd and Kronstadt, and to gain a footing for the winter in the Baltics Provinces with a view to overwhelming them, and then to drive on to Petrograd.

 Defemsive positions in Riga, Nov 1919

63. I had constant rumours that the Dreadnought Battleship "Sevastopol" had been prepared for, and was in every way fit for, service - also, there was ever-recurring Submarine activity - and by my reckoning there were still two large Destroyers available as well, though two had been destroyed by our mines during the operations in support of Yudenitch whilst attempting to come out and attack our patrols at night.
64. The work of the Destroyers was, as ever, tireless, dauntless, and never ending, and with never the relaxation of lying in a defended port with fires out and full rations, and all their work in cramped navigational waters (necessitating the almost constant presence on deck of the Captain, and, in the case of the Petrograd Bay '" Biorko " Patrol, always within the range, and often under the fire, of the twelve-inch guns from Fort Krasnaya Gorka.
65. This patrolling of Petrograd Bay, though generally in smooth water, was arduous and anxious always, because there was no room to manoeuvre East or West—there were mines in each direction—much foul ground, unindicated by the charts, and the charting of the Southern, Shore disagreed by a mile of longitude with that of the Northern - also for that small space, (six by twenty miles), bounded on the West by Seskar, and on the East by the minefields, three charts had to be in use.
66. In the whole of that area no shoals (and there are many), were marked by anything better than a spar buoy. When the winter came on, with incessant snow and fog throughout the long sixteen-hour nights, I scarcely hoped that the Destroyers could succeed in maintaining their stations without frequent and serious groundings or collisions, and the fact that they did is sufficient witness of the spirit that was in these two Flotillas—the First, "Captain George W. McO. Campbell, and the Second, 'Captain
Colin K.. MacLean, reinforced by some of the Third Flotilla also, under the command of Commander Aubrey T. Tillard, in "Mackay".
The energy, care and forethought which these two officers constantly displayed in order to maintain the efficiency of their Flotillas, I must always bear in most grateful admiration and remembrance.
The boats were always in "watch and watch" - i.e., as often at sea as in harbour, and very frequently under harder conditions.

67. At the beginning of the campaign the enemy's active Naval Force appeared to be -
2 Battleships (1 Dreadnought "Petfopavlovsk", 1 "Andrei Pervozvanni")
1 Cruiser ("Oleg"),
5 Destroyers ("Novik" class),
2 to 4 Submarines, and perhaps 4 smaller coal-burning Torpedo Boats, besides Minesweepers.
68. Of these -
2 Battleships ("Petropavloysk" and "Andrei Pervozvanni") were torpedoed and disabled in Kronstadt Harbour, and have not moved since - except "Andrei Pervozvanni" into dock.
1 Cruiser ("Oleg") was torpedoed and sunk at her moorings off Kronstadt.
3 Destroyers ("Novik" class), "Azard", "Gavril" and "Constantin" were sunk, two of them by our mines, the other either by mine or torpedo.
1 Patrol Vessel (armed), " Kitoboi", which surrendered on the night of 14th-15th June,
and, I think,
2 Submarines, one by depth charge and the other by mine.
Besides this -
1 Oiler was bombed and badly damaged.
A number of Motor Launches were set on fire and destroyed,
and .
1 Submarine Depot Ship ("Pamiet Azov") was torpedoed and sunk, all in Kronstadt Harbour.
An Oil Fuel Store and a very large quantity of wood and coal fuel was also burnt.
69. Against this our losses have been :
1 Submarine ("L.55") mined and sunk.
1 Destroyer ("Verulam") mined and sunk.
1 Destroyer ("Vittoria") torpedoed and sunk by enemy submarine.
2. Mine-sweeping Sloops ("Gentian" and "Myrtle") mined and sunk.
3 Coastal Motor Boats sunk during the attack 'on Kronstadt.
2 Coastal Motor Boats blown up; unserviceable.
2 Coastal Motor Boats and 2 Motor Launches sunk through stress of weather whilst in tow.
1 Store Carrier ("Volturnous") mined and sunk.
1 Light' Cruiser' ("Curacoa") mined and salved.
1 Paddle Mine-sweeper ("Banbury" mined and salved.
1 Motor Launch (M.L.156) mined and salved.
1 Admiralty Oiler ("War Expert") mined and salved.
1 Mine-layer ("Princess Margaret") damaged 'by mine.
70.—The losses of.personnel have been:
Killed.
Royal Navy .. ... 16 Officers. 97 Men...
Royal Air Force ... 4 Officers. 1 Man.
Total 20 Officers. 98 Men..

71. My aim was throughout the year to prevent any Bolshevik warships breaking out into.the Gulf of Finland - and the ice has now relieved me of this responsibility - and also to frustrate by every means the most evident design of the Germans to overrun and. dominate the Baltic Provinces and then to advance Petrograd, and their repulse from both Riga and Libau in October and November by the Lettish troops under cover of the bombardment of our ships has, I think, put an end to this also, and all German troops were back into Prussia by 15th December.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
WALTER COWAN,
Rear-Admiral Commanding First Light
Cruiser Squadron.

The British view of the Baltic, 1919. Part 1

The British intervention in the Russian Civil War was not a great success - after all, the Reds won. However, one place where they did some good was in the Baltic. The Royal Naval commander there during 1919 was Rear Admiral Walter Cowan. This is his official report.

 London Gazette
6th April 1920

"Delhi" at Devonport,
SIR,
1. I have the honour to forward herewith this my report on my year's Service in Command of His Majesty's Naval Forces in the Baltic, where I relieved Rear-Admiral Sir Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, K.C.B., M.V.O., on .the 6th January, 1919.

2. When I arrived the German situation was as.follows: German troops were nominally in occupation of Latvia, with Headquarters at Libau.
The Bolsheviks were in Riga, and gradually advancing South and West
The German Troops were of low morale, and in a poor state of discipline - and wherever the Bolsheviks advanced the Germans fell back, in many cases handing over arms and munitions to the Bolsheviks on their retirement.
3. The Bolsheviks had by the middle of February advanced so far as Windau, and were also within forty miles from Libau from the Westward.
4. I therefore in "Caledon " (Commander Henry S. M. Harrison-Wallace, R.N.) shelled them out of Windau; and made what preparations I could to evacuate the refugees from Libau, as I did not consider an indiscriminate shelling of the town in the event of its occupation by the Bolsheviks would be advisable if no troops were available to land for its reoccupation.

5. Shortly after this (at the end of February), large German reinforcements began to arrive by sea, and General-Major Graf Von. der Goltz assumed command. at Libau, and very soon afterwards stabilised the situation, and drove the Bolsheviks well East again - and this, so far, was satisfactory.
6. In the meantime the Letts - under the direction of M^. Ulmanis, the Acting President. - were making every endeavour to raise and equip a sufficient military force - aided by a. limited quantity of small arms and machine guns - to enable them to undertake the defence of their own country against the Bolsheviks when the time should come for the Germans to withdraw. It soon became evident, however, that it was not the Germans' intention to permit any Lettish Force being raised, and constant cases of friction, oppression and disarmament of Lettish Troops began to occur
7. The climax was reached on the 16th April, when at the Naval Harbour - where the Headquarters of the Lettish Troops were - German troops raided these Headquarters, arrested and disarmed all the Officers, and looted money and documents, killing and wounding several Lettish soldiers. Simultaneously with this, in the town of Libau itself, Baltic-German troops arrested those members of the Lettish Government who were unable to escape them, whilst the rest took refuge on board His Majesty's ships, and
M. Ulmanis, the Acting President, with the British Mission, which consequently was surrounded by Baltic-German sentries.
8. That night two young Baltic-German Officers came off to my ship and announced that they were the Heads of the Committee of Safety until the formation of a new Government, and asked me if I could guarantee them the support of His Majesty's Government in this movement.
I pointed out to them that until I had some satisfactory explanation for the events of the day I could listen to and recognise no such proposals.
I then sent them on shore again and heard nothing more of them.

Libau 1919

9. On my requiring an explanation from Von der Goltz for these happenings, he denied all responsibility or knowledge for them, saying that his troops were out of hand, and that the Baltic-Germans were not under his orders.
10. In consequence of this I called a meeting of the Allied representatives, and with them demanded the following from Von der Gdltz;
First. - That the unit which raided the Lettish Headquarters should be at once removed from the Libau district.
Second. - That the Commanding Officer of the offending Baltic-German Unit be relieved of his command.
We also gave him the time and date by which we required the fulfilment of these demands.
11. Both were complied with within the time, but Von der Goltz stated that as he considered the Lettish Government to be Bolshevik and a danger to the district he was administering by order of the Allies, he could not agree to their release from arrest, or the continuance of their functions.
12. This state of affairs was reported to Paris accordingly, and a very few days afterwards, owing to the melting of the ice, and signs of activity by the Bolshevik Fleet, I had myself to proceed, to the Gulf of Finland, and Commodore Arthur A. M. Duff, C.B., arrived on the 29th May and took charge of affairs in the Western Baltic; and thereafter, by his quick and accurate grasp of the whole German situation there, freed me from a very considerable portion of my preoccupations.
It is hard for me to do justice on paper to the adequacy and effectiveness of his administration until he left for England again on the 28th September. I have now transferred to him the duties of Senior Naval Officer in the Baltic.

13.. On arrival in the Gulf of Finland and reviewing the situation, my hope and intention was - as soon as ice conditions allowed it - to move as far East as possible in order to support the left flank of the Esthonian Front, and to protect it from any attempt at being turned from the sea.
14. After getting into touch with the Esthonian Naval and Military Authorities, I went over to Helsingfors to call on the Regent (General G. Mannerheim), and also to congratulate the Finns on the recognition of the independence, which had been announced the previous day. Circumstances then obliged me to return to Libau for a day on the 12th May.
15. I had previously - on the 7th May - shifted my flag from " Caledon" to "Curacoa," On returning from Libau to Reval on the 13th May " Curacoa " struck a mine, which disabled her from further service and occasioned eleven casualties amongst her personnel.

 HMS Caledon

16. I therefore shifted to " Cleopatra," and left Reval the next morning for the Eastward, and, from the 14th May onwards I lay - first in Narva Bay for a few days reconnoitring as far as Kaporia whilst the Esthonians were landing and operating between there and Louga - and then, as they established themselves further East, I moved forward to Seskar.
from which place, with the very good visibility prevailing day after day, I was able from the mast head to keep an effective watch on Petrograd Bay.

17. The situation then was somewhat of an anxiety to me, as the strength of the Bolshevik. Naval Forces was known to include Armoured Ships - the Esthonians were lying in Kaporia with 1 unarmed Transport (including the Nekmangrund Light Vessel, so hard up were they for ships), an old,  slow ex-Russian Gunboat " Bobr," and one ex-Russian Destroyer, dependent on me for fuel, of which I had then, only a limited supply - and my own Force consisted only of "Cleopatra " and four Destroyers, the Seventh Submarine Flotilla arriving shortly afterwards at Reval.
18. From then onwards I maintained a watch on the Bay, whilst the Esthonians were constantly in contact with the Bolshevik Troops, bombarding and pushing forward here and there, and landing more men, whilst relieving those who needed refit, always under the direction of Admiral John Pitka, who, before the War, was a Shipowner of Reval and Director of a Salvage Company, but who assumed command of the Esthonian Naval Forces last winter, and has always shown a most correct instinct for war, both on land and sea. He has since been decorated by His Majesty.

19. On the 17th May a great deal of smoke was observed over Kromstadt; and on the 18th five Bolshevik craft, led by a large Destroyer of the "Avtroil" type came as far West as Dolgoi Nos, five miles clear of the Petrogriad Minefields, and then while still close under the land turned back. So in "Cleopatra" (Captain Charles James Colebrooke Little, C.B) with " Shakespeare " (Commander, now Captain, Frederick Edward Ketelbey Strong, D.S.O.), " Scout " (Lieutenant-Commander Edmund F. Fitzgerald), and " Walker " (Lieutenant-Commander Ambrose T. N.), I went ahead full speed from Seskar on an Easterly course, closing the range rapidly from 20,000 to 16,000 yards when fire was opened, the Bolshevik Destroyer, flying a very large red flag, firing the first shot. I stood on until within half a mile of the mined area, and came under the fire of the Grey Horse Battery, but by this time the range was opening and spotting very difficult, owing to the vessels being close under the land all the time.
20. The speed of the enemy appeared to be reduced to about ten knots, one good hit on the Destroyer at any rate was observed, but under the circumstances I did not consider it advisable to run in over the minefields and under the guns of the shore batteries in order to obtain a decision, and so these craft made good their escape.
21. To the Eastward, but not taking part in the action, was a three-funnelled Cruiser, the "Oleg," and to the Eastward of her again was smoke - and it was reported that the Bolshevik Dreadnought Battleship "Petropavlovsk" was also out.

22. On the 24th May General Sir Hubert Gough arrived in "Galatea" on a special Mission to Finland and the Baltic States, and I accompanied him over to Helsingfors to assist at his ceremonial landing, and to salute him there, and went with him to interview the Finnish authorities, thereafter leaving again for the Eastward, leaving " Galatea" at Helsingfors.

 HMS Walker

23. On the 31st May, whilst still lying off Seskar in "Cleopatra" with "Dragon" (Captain Francis Arthur Marten, C.M.G., C.V.O.), "Galatea" (Captain Charles Morton Forbes, D.S.O.), " Wallace" (Captain George William McOran Campbell), "Voyager" (Lieutenant-Commander Charles Gage Stuart, D'.S.C.), "Vanessa" (Lieutenant- Commander Edward Osborne Broadley, D.S.O.), "Wryneck" (Commander Ralph Vincent Eyre, E..N.), "Versatile" (Commander Gerald Wynter, O.B.E.), "Vivacious" (Commander Claude L. Bate, R.N.), and with "Walker" and two Submarines on patrol, a Bolshevik Destroyer was sighted coming West with a Dreadnought Battleship, and two other small craft behind the minefields. The Destroyer was engaged by "Walker" and chased Eastwards, the Battleship opening a heavy and well-controlled fire at the same time.
24. On the first report I weighed and steamed East, a Bolshevik aeroplane appearing overhead and dropping bombs among my force as it advanced, but it flew off Eastwards on being fired at.
25. The Destroyer fell back on the battleship, which manoeuvred behind the minefields and kept up a heavy and well-disciplined fire on "Walker" as she fell back to meet me;
Fort Krasnaya Gorka having a kite balloon up and firing also.
26. I stood up and down the edge of the minefield, but the Bolshevik Force showed no intention of coming on, and retired Eastwards after a few salvoes had been fired.
27. "Walker " was hit twice, but no appreciable damage was done, and there was one slight casualty only.
28. It now became apparent to me that with the small forces at my disposal it would be necessary, in order to keep an effective watch on Bolshevik Naval movements, and in particular to, if possible, ensure that no mines were laid to the Westward of the existing fields across the entrance to Petrograd Bay, that I should.have a Base nearer to Kronstadt than Reyal.
29. I therefore moved to Biorko, and required certain assistance from the Finns in the way of patrols and accommodation on shore agreed to by them.

Estonian cavalry

Compared to the large cavalry armies of the East, Estonia seems to have had remarkably few cavalry. For example, at the battle of Cesis in June 1919 they had only 65 with 6,500 infantry, whereas the German Frei Korps had 500-600 for about the same number of infantry. When the 1st Cavalry Regiment had been formed in December 1918 most of the officers had had no cavalry training in the Tsarist forces, and many of the men could not even ride.

Estonian cavalry 1919 (The Estonian War Museum - General Laidoner Museum)

By May 1919 there were two cavalry regiments, the 1st with 4 squadrons, the 2nd with 3, and both with machine gun and signal detachments, about 900 men. There were differences though, the best trained, and motivated, men had joined the 1st Regiment when it was formed, so that throughout the war it performed much better than the 2nd Regiment, and had higher morale. In May, both cavalry regiments were attached to the 3rd Division, so the the 1st and 2nd Divisions had no cavalry formations at all. By October the 1st Regiment had been transferred to the 2nd Division, but the 1st still had none.

Instead, cavalry were attached to other units, so that each infantry regiment had a cavalry detachment of about 20-30 men (a Ratsakomando) for scouting. Gradually the numbers increased, so when the 7th Infantry Regiment was formed in December 1919 it had about 80 cavalry out of 1,714 men, as well as a ski/ cyclist platoon.

An Estonian armoured train in the forest

Companies also operated in conjunction with armoured trains (Soomusrongide divisjoni eskadrons), which were quite a feature of warfare in the area. The Estonians had pioneered the use of attachments of infantry and cavalry in this regard - the infantry, heavily equipped with automatic weapons, could hold areas, whilst the cavalry could scout around a prevent unpleasant surprises.

An example comes from the reminiscences of Willem Rakfeldt, leader of the cavalry troop on No. 3 armoured train, which took part in the liberation of Tartu in 1919. The line to Tartu was held by Latvian units, and other trains had been repeatedly held up by partisans cutting the track.

"We were ten men at the disposal of the commander of the train. Several of our horses were captured from the enemy. Our horsemen moved ahead on both sides of the train and we saw a lot of Reds but they did not break the rails in front of us.
I sent two young men on horseback to gather intelligence. However they were made prisoner. They were placed in a pig sty and locked in. But the boys managed to break out and escape to the forest. They were shot at, but manged to evade and fortunately came back to us unscathed.

 The attack on Tartu

Armoured trains 1 and 3 went on towards Tartu. A few kilometres from the city we left the train and circled around to enter the city from the left. The Reds were retiring and setting fire to the city. Locals immediately directed us to the Kreditklassa building where prisoners were held in the basement. We reached there at the same time as men from No. 1 train. We opened the basement door and saw terrible images. People were lying on the floor and on top of each other, still warm and bloody. We found one man who was wounded and had multiple leg wounds. He survived."
http://vapsid.weebly.com/artur-sirk.html

Estonian armour, 1919

During 1919 the small republic of Estonia had to fight for it´s existence against vastly superior numbers of Bolshevik Russians coming from the North and East, and then German Frei Korps from the South. With help from the British Royal Navy, and many volunteers from the Scandinavian countries, especially Finland, they somehow survived.

The Estonians didn´t inherit much from Tsarist Russia. The only destroyer in their fleet had been captured by the British from the Bolsheiks, and they had no armoured cars. They did however have a factory in Taliin, the Federal Foundary, and they resolved to make their own.

The first, the "Tasuja", was built on a Renault chassis and rushed into action against the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1918/9. Unfortunately it got stuck on a damaged bridge during a battle in March and was consequently destroyed.

The next two designs were the "Estonia" and the "Wahur", the latter based on a Packhard lorry chassis. They were rapidly send into action in March 1919, but the "Estonia" was found to be two heavy for the winter roads, and was restricted to Tallinn, though in the summer it was sent south, and by the autumn it had managed to get to Narva to take part in the defence against the Red Army.

 The "Estonia"

There was also the "Vanapagan", based on a Delahaye (2-ton) chassis. It was described at the time as looking as though the armour had been added by a village blacksmith, and Vanapagan was a clumsy giant in Estonian folklore, but it was effective enough.

By now the Estonians were experienced enough to develop a standard design of armoured car, though armoured truck would be more appropriate. Based on an AEC 3 ton chassis, each had a 37mm automatic gun in the turret, two rear facing MGs and a Madsen LMG to the front. The armour was 6-10 mm thick and they weighed up to 8 tons! We are not talking mass production here, they were individually made, and each had a name. Apparently the cars were so noisy when driving that it was almost impossible for the crew to shout to each other.

"Toonela" - complted in April 1919 and on active duty April 22nd
"Kalewipoeg"- completed April 1919, on active duty April 25th. The Kalewipoeg was commaned by a         Swedish volunteer, Einar Lundburg, of which more anew.
"Wibuane" - completed April 1919, and on active duty April 23rd
"Kotkasilm" -  completed January 1920.
"Erilane" - completed January 1920, later renamed "Lembit"

In 1919 the Estonians captured two "proper" ex-Russian army cars, which they renamed the "Tasuja 2" and "Suur Tõll". These were Austin-Putilovs, each with two 7.62mm Maxim MGs in two turrets.

 The Tasuja 2

There was also a Peerless anti-aircraft car, captured by the Finnish volunteer regiment Pohjan Pojat on the 14th March 1919 and donated, willingly or not, to the Estonians in April, where it was renamed the "Pisuhänd". These were basically Peerless trucks adapted by the British to carry a machine gun and pom pom gun, and used by the Russian army as anti-aircraft guns. Even by the standards of the day it was considered slow and heavy, with poor off road performance, but reliable

During summer the cars were painted olive-green , in winter grey/white or just grey, to blend into the inevitable snow. Nonetheless, the name was invariably painted on the side in large letters!

Operation

Although they had pretty good armour and firepower, the Estonian armoured cars were not well suited to cross country travel, especially in the deep Baltic winter. Mostly, they had to stick to roads and were used for patrols behind the front line. Nonetheless, when they could be used they were often effective.

i) Fighting the Frei Corps

The "Estonia", "Toonela" and "Vanapagan"  were part of the reinforcements sent to the Southern front in June 1919, to resist the pro-German Frei Corps, the "Vanapagan" attached to the 6th Regiment.

On June 20th 1919, near Riga, the Germans launched attacks all along the front. All day these were resisted, but at about 5 pm the Vilandi Cadets were finally forced to retreat from the mansion they had been defending, and the way was open to Stolben. At this moment the commander, Lt. Col Reek, committed his reserve, the “Estonia” and “Toonela” together with an assault detachment on an armoured train. The "Estonia" carried on down the road whilst the "Toonela" peeled off and moved amongst estate outbuildings. This drove back the attack, although even then infantry from the assault company werer needed to fill the line, as the armoured cars could not traverse the terrain. Further attacks were made but the front had been stabilised.

 The "Vanapagan"

The "Vanapagan", and a handful of infantry from the sappers of the 6th Regiment, skirmished with some Red Latvian infantry & cavalry on the 21s,t but it didn't amount to much and they returned to the Murmuiža estate were they were based.

On the 22nd the Estonians counter attacked at the village of Starte. The road into the village emerged from woodland and then through about 500m of open farmland before entering the village. All of this was well covered by machine guns from the defenders and the company attacking made very slow progress down drainage ditches. Suddenly, the "Vanapagan" dashed full tilt down the road into the village, firing as it went, the Estonians lept to their feet and charged the village, and it was taken. Unfortunately the "Vanapagan" could not follow up the pursuit as it was running low in fuel.

By the 25th the “Vanapagan” needed essential maintenance, and the "Estonia" had serious mechanical problems, but the “Toonela” was stationed on the Riga-Pskov highway guarding the bridge at Cesis.

ii) Einar Lundborg

Einar Lundborg and the "Kalevipoeg"

Einar Lundourg was one of those people who are natural adventurers. He had been in the Swedish army before resigning to join a Swedish volunteer brigade, helping the Finns in their fight for independence against the Russians. He did well there, but when the war was won he returned to Sweden and joined the 5th Hussars. This seemed to bore him rather, so when an office opened in Stockhom recruiting for the Estonian war of Independence he volunteered. By March 1919 he was with other Swedish volunteers, the Svenska Karen, at the battle of Narva.

In April a number of armoured cars became available, and Lundborg was chosen to captain the "Kalevipoeg", setting off for the Southern front.

On May 25th, Lundberg was with the Estonians when they took Pskov, the highwater mark of their advance. The "Kalevipoeg" cleared the way for the attack into the town, and Lundborg was later known as the "King of Pskov".

In September the "Kalevipoeg" was part of August Nieländer's armoured car squadron when it temporarily turned away from the main column, leaving them unprotected from Bolshevik attacks. This seems to have given rise to some bitterness in the infantry, so that shortly afterwards Lundborg found himself without infantry support during a five and and half hour battle, losing 5 of his men. He was only rescued when the "Pishund" appeared and drove the enemy off.

Disillusioned, Lundberg resigned and joined the Swedish White Legion with the White Russian forces at Narva, but something there did not suit him either, and by November he was back in Sweden. Lundborg went on to be a pilot, earning fame for the rescue to Umberto Noble when his airship crashed in the Artic, and in the end dying flying as a test pilot in 1931.

Utria 1919

In the chaos following the First World war and the Russian revolution many peoples seized the chance to leave the Russian Empire. One such was the tiny republic of Estonia on the Baltic Sea. Unfortunately, the Bolsheviks turned out to be just as Imperialist as the Tsars, if not more so, and in 1918 a huge Soviet army entered Estonia sweeping all before it. The 6th Red Rifle division captured Narva with support from an ex Imperial cruiser and two destroyers giving artillery support, whilst the 2nd Novgorod Division attacked south of Lake Peipus. Both Russian divisions were about 7,000 strong well stocked with artillery, machine guns and supported by armoured trains and armoured cars. The Estonians were about equal in man power, but only about 2,000 had proper training and they only had light weapons, the rest were untrained militia. By December the Reds were within 34km of the Estonian capital, Tallinn, and were shelling from the sea.

Estonia was saved mainly by Britain and Finland. A Royal Navy squadron under Rear Admiral Sir Edwyn Alexander-Sinclair arrived off Tallinn on the 31st of December, and captured the two Russian destroyers, Spatak and Avtril, turning them over the the Estonians to be renamed Vambola and Lennuk. The rest of the Soviet fleet was then bottled up in Kronstadt. They also delivered 6,500 rifles, 200 machine guns and 2 field guns. The Finns delivered 5,000 rifles and 20 field guns for the new army, and 2,000 volunteers arrived in January. Early in 1919 the counter attack began, and city after city was liberated. Narva was still held by the 6th Red Rifle division, and with control at sea guaranteed by the Royal Navy a daring plan was hatched to capture it.

Plans and forces

The road to Narva was blocked by various garrisoned towns which would hold up any advance and withdraw onto the main force at Narva itself. The plan was to launch an amphibious assault between these garrsions and Narva, catching them by surprise and stopping them retreating into the city.

On 12th January Captain Johan Pitka was put in charge of the operation. On the 13th the newly Estonian Lennuk brought in the information that the 50th infantry regiment was at Hungerburgis, at the mouth of the river Narva, and the 46th Estonian Red Regiment was nearby. 600 men of the Finnish volunteer battalion were embarked on two transport ships from the port of Kunda and they rendezvoused with the Estonian contingent on the evening of the 16th outside Taliin.

In total there were 600 Finns and 400 Estonians, together with sailors and some machine guns. The biggest contingent was the Finnish volunteer battalion under Major Martin Ekströmi consisting of four companies, the 1st under Captain Antto Eskola. Then there was the Estonian Assault battalion under Karl Aleksander Pauluse. This consisted of three "roods" of about 100 men each under Lieutenants Karl Tulmini,  Otto Jansoni and staff Sergeant Hans Rebase. After that there were two small detachments. The Narva Defence League of 28 men under under Ensign Aleksandrovi, which although small was invaluable for their local knowledge. And also a squad of White Russian officers (30 men).

There was no real Estonian uniform as such, according to the Estonian War Museum most were wearing ex-Russian uniforms at this time.The Finns though had their own uniforms.

 Finnish volunteers arriving in Talinn, December 1918

There were nine ships in the fleet. The most powerful was the Lennuk whose 5x 100mm guns had arange of nearly 14 km. As a "gift" from the British she was to prove invaluable. Also very busy was the gun boat Lembit. There were two mine sweepers, the Olev and Kalev, two coast guard vessels, the Laene & Lood, two tugs, the Wrangel & Santsev, and the Reval.

Opposing them the Soviets had many men, but scattered and not expecting an attack from this direction. In Narva itself there was the 7th Petrograd regiment, with one battalion of the 50th at Narva-Joesuu, about 800 and 200 men respectively. Assigned to coastal defence was the 86th regiment, with 500 men and 10 guns. In addition to these units there were 200 marines from Kronstadt, a battalion of Estonian communists (the 53rd Viljandi Kütipolgu) and a cavalry squadron of about 50 sabres. There was also, significantly, two armoured trains. This sounds quaint now, but armoured trains were potent weapons at the time. Not only could they travel vast distances in mid winter, they also mounted wagons with heavy artillery, delivering it where it was needed.

The Landings

At three in the morning of the 17th January 1919 the little fleet left the Bay of Kunda, sailing through the bitterly cold night.  There were reports that the Russian ice-breaker 'Ogon', which was adapted to lay sea mines, had visited the mouth of the Narva river so this was discounted as a landing site. Instead Pitka chose a village near the Kotsenevi palace where it was known that the beach had little surf, though the area  could be windy. This area was a popular holiday resort in the summer because of the beaches and there were many manor houses and dachas scattered amongst the woodland.

Part of the landing beach at Utria

About 250 men were ferried ashore in 11 boats starting at midday. There was scattered artillery fire, especially from the Soviet armoured trains, but the landing ships were out of range and the fire from the "Lennuk" and"Lembitu" soon silenced the guns. However, by then the wind was getting up and after two boats were capsized, tipping their men into the freezing water,  Captain Pitka stooped further landings at 18-40

The first wave, mainly Finns and a detachment of cadets from Narva, (the Narva Kaitseliidu salgast) immediately moved inland across the snow and assaulted Utria, breaking into the village centre after a small battle and driving out the Soviets leaving four dead. Barriers were placed on roads entering the village in anticipation of a counter attack.

By 23:00 the wind had died down and the remaining troops could be landed through the night, it was still bitterly cold but a full moon helped and they finished at 11 am on the 18th. A conference was held between Pitka and Ekstrom on how to proceed and they distributed their forces. The Finnish 2nd company was ordered to join the first that had landed in the first wave and push on towards Narva. The 3rd and 4th Finnish companies and the Russians were sent towards Laagna followed by the Estonian battalion, less the 2nd company which stayed to garrison Utria. The men from Narva were split between the other detachments to act as guides.

Meanwhile, the "Lembit" and "Lennuk" had headed to the mouth of the Narva River and started bombarding Narva. At approximately 11-30, after a 1hr bombardment, white flags appeared over Hungerburgis at the river mouth. The Lembit continued shelling Narva whilst the Lennuk returned to support the landings at Utria.

The amphibious assault behind their lines had taken the Reds completely by surprise. On the 18th Ekström Utriast announced that the 4th Finnish company had taken Laagna, the 2nd had taken Merikülani and then turned towards Riigiküla as Narva-Jõesuu had already been taken by the crew of the Lembit. The 3rd company had reinforced the 4th and had repelled an attack by communist Estonian forces on Laagna manor.

 Laagna Manor

The main Soviet counter attack came at Laagna Manor, with two of the Red Army companies, a squad of cavalry, and two armoured trains. They assembled around the railway line and poured fire into the house. After the first two assaults had been repelled the defending commander sent the following message...

"The enemy is located in the woods opposite Laagna manor , around the track. From reports of prisoners are there for 2 companies and a squad of cavalry. We are taking a  lot of fire from there. Two offensives, we hit back, and are waiting for the third. Condition is serious but not hopeless. Anyway, do not retreat from our estate. I lost three good officers, one of them died, some 10 soldiers wounded and dead. The Finns are hit especially hard."

The Lennuk shelled both the railway track and surrounding forest and the Soviet forces were driven off. The hinterland of the landing area was now secure.

Aftermath

The landings had been a complete success, taking the Russians by surprise and capturing territory. Most importantly, with the area under Estonian control the fight for the important city of Nara could start, and it fell in heavy fighting the next day. The front now became the Narva river. Despite campaigning in the middle of winter the Estonians had advanced 200 km in just 11 days.