Onega & Back Part 4 - the War in the Air

By May 1919 the small British expeditionary force operating out of Murmansk had advanced 500 miles down the Murmansk-Petrograd railway to the shores of Lake Onega. After endless dense forest this meant that airplanes could finally be used, not just to see where the Bolsheviks were, but to attack them.

There does not seem to be much available on the operations around the lake in English, but a very thorough study is available online in Russian - The Great River War, 1918-1920 by Alexander B. Shirokorad (2006) at http://lib.ec/b/385785/read, and most of what follows comes from there. With luck someone might translate the whole book properly in the future.

Forces

The Allied base was at the town of Medveja Gora, at the head of the lake. The Allies didn't need an airfield, all they needed was open water - seaplanes had been shipped up to Murmansk on the carriers HMS Nairana and HMS Pegasus and it was easy to fly then down to Onega, which as the 2nd largest lake in Europe made a perfect operating area. Facilities were built rapidly and the first planes arrived on June 6th 1919.

 A Fairey IIIC being unloaded from a seaplane carrier

Two types of seaplane were used. The first to arrive were Fairey IIICs. These were 2 seaters, with a pilot and observer, and could carry up to 500lbs of bombs under their wings. In many cases this meant 2x 230lb bombs, specially developed by the British for destroying fortifications, bridges or railways. They also had a forward facing Vickers machine gun, and a Lewis gun on a flexible mount for the observer.

The Short type 184 was another 2 seater, which as well as carrying 520 lb of bombs could also carry a torpedo. What it didn't have was a forward facing machine gun, just a Lewis gun for the observer.

Apparently the Bolsheviks also had an airforce, at least in Febuary 1919 they are listed as having two Grigorovich M9 seaplanes at their lakeside base at Petrozavodsk. In many ways the M9 was equivalent to the British machines, it could even be modified to carry a 37mm cannon, but they seem to have made no impression in the campaign. Perhaps because the armament wasn't available, the itinerary lists only 5 and 10 lb bombs. In any event the Allies had complete air superiority.

A Grigorovich M9

Actions

On June 7th, the day after they arrived, two Fairey IIIcs on patrol found and attacked three gunboats, no.s 4, 6 and 8 with 112 and 20 lb bombs. The gunboats, actually converted paddle steamers, were each armed with two machine guns but failed to hit their attackers. On the other hand, although four bombs were dropped on both gunboats 4 and 8, none hit.

On June 9th the Bolsheviks reported bombing raids over a period of 4 hours on gunboats 2 and 7, with apparently 21 bombs dropped on number 2, and 7 on number 7. The British view of this can be seen from the commendation of Observer Officer Frederick Eades, published in the London Gazette.

"On June 9, 1919, whilst serving with the " Syren " Force in North Russia,  this officer was on night patrol (observer) in heavy rain, investigating the enemy's position off Schunga, on Lake Onega. Their position was attacked  from a height of 300 ft. by machine gun and bombs, the latter being thrown  from the observer's cockpit. Having expended all ammunition, the machine  returned to base, and after refilling, again attacked and drove one gunboat  ashore. A second gunboat was later seen to be in tow, presumably damaged  in the attack."

The seaplane base at Medveja Gora

On June 11th Eades was again in cation, flying as observer to Flying Officer Issac. Three Fairey IIIcs made an attack on a gunboat patrol, but although they approached to within 50m only minor casualties were caused.

It was becoming clear to the Bolsheviks that their anti-aircraft fire was pretty useless, even when supplemented by rifle fire. To justify this to their superiors the crews started to report "armoured" bombers, even though the British had nothing of the kind!

Bridges and trains also made tempting targets, though very difficult ones, and to increase accuracy the pilots started to come in low, at about 30ft. A bombing run on the railway on June 11th blew a 6 meter crater in the track using a 230 lb bomb. On June 29th a patrol found came across a train and attacked it directly, coming in at 70ft, and zigzagging to avoid anti-aircraft fire. They dropped a 230 lb bomb directly in front of the train, which ripped the engine in half.

 A Short 184 seaplane

Attacks on gunboats were common but generally unsuccessful, although on July 1st the tender "Auguste Blanqui" was hit by a bomb which blew up the bridge, though it still managed to limp back to Petrozavodsk. One innovation was the use of shrapnel bombs, which didn't need a direct hit to work. On June 29th the captain of gunboat 2 was severely wounded by a bomb exploding over 10m away.

By July 10th the Bolsheviks were forced to abandon lake patrols, and the British started to attack Petrozavodsk directly. On August 5th a flight of 4 seaplanes bombed the Bolshevik base there, dropping 20 bombs around the base and the docks. There were further raids on August 7th and then on the 18th, when a 230lb bomb made a crater over 4m deep.

In September the British started to prepare for withdrawal, transferring some of their aircraft to White Russian forces and training up pilots. The last patrol was on September 29th, by Captain Park and a Russian observer, Lt. Motorin.

In total British seaplanes on Onega flew a total of 616 hours and dropped 1,014 bombs as well as 25,000 propaganda leaflets, and shot 47,500 rounds of ammunition. Reconnaissance flights photographed and mapped over ​​250 square miles.

Onega & Back Part 3 - Action on the Lake 1919

When you join the navy you probably don't expect to find yourself in the middle of a lake in Russia, but in early 1919 that's exactly where a small Royal Navy flotilla were. Admittedly Lake Onega is enormous, the 2nd largest in Europe, but they had still had to get there by rail, from Murmansk. In fact even then a path had to be cut through the forest to even reach the lake shore. Fortunately, a party of American railroad engineers was available to do the job, and a naval base of two American (40ft)  and 11 British small (55ft) "coastal motor boats" (CMBs) was set upon the lake. Unfortunately, the Americans were withdrawn by their government, handing over one of their boats to the Royal Navy, who promptly christened it the Jolly Roger!

 To understand why Lake Onega was so important you have to appreciate that the only route from St Petersburg (Petrograd) through dense forest to the Allied/White base at Murmansk was the Murmansk Railway, and the only population in this area was in the villages around the lake. Control the lake, and the railway, and you controlled the whole area.

The Royal Navy on Lake Onega

Initially it was far from clear that the British would control anything on the lake. Their flotilla of small launches was drawfed by the Bolshevik fleet, which in February 1919 stood at 4 medium size lake steamers, 4 floating batteries and 2 minelayers, armed with a mixture of 75,mm, 47mm, and 35mm guns and machine guns. They also had 2 Grigorovich M-9 seaplanes, although as we will see later, the British had plans of their own in this regard.

 A view of Lake Onega in 1915, including a view of one of the lake steamers (Library of Congress)

The British flotilla was commanded by Lt Commander Mather, a former Antarctic exploder, who from the start decided the best form of attack was defence, mounting raids all over the lake, and increasing his fleet at the expense of the Bolsheviks.

Early in June, the four armed Bolshevik lake steamers were observed steaming on Lake Onega northwest towards Medvyejya. Mather, in command of a flotilla of CMBs, engaged the enemy and for this action he was later awarded the Distinguished Service Order (DSO). The citation reads:

"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty, on the 5 June 1919, before Shunski Bor, Lake Onega, when in command of four motor boats he engaged four enemy steamers, carrying many heavy guns, in order to relieve the Russians who were being heavily attacked. Notwithstanding the disparity in armament he caused the enemy vessels to retire south, and so enabled the Russians to counter-attack with success. He showed throughout great courage and devotion to duty and set a fine example to all".

The "Jolly Roger" with it's 3 pdr gun was kept busy bombarding Bolsehvik positions on the shoreline, such as on June 10th when it attacked the village of Fedotova on the Shunga peninsula destroying a bridge and killing 30 Bolsheviks. Unfortunately, on July 8th a fire in the engine room exploded the petrol tank and the ship was lost.

 The "Jolly Roger"

Better news came on August 3rd when three of the four Bolshevik steamers were captured, 'Silny", 'Pajalostny" and "Azod' off Tolvuya, Lake Onega. With a decent troop carrying capacity Mather got even more ambitious.

The Raid on Rimskaya

On August 29th a major raid was launched on Rimskaya, 80 miles from Medveja Gora and the Bolshevik headquarters on the eastern side of Lake Onega. The raiding force would consist of 130 Russians, 25 Serbians, and 60 men of the British naval flotilla, all carried in a small fleet consisting  of the Sileny (a captured Bolshevik steamer), the Axod (a captured Bolshevik tug), the Royal Navy motor boats and various small Russian chasers.

 A view, reportedly, of the jetty at Rimskaya during the action

The Axod was first alongside the landing stage, a British officer leaping of the bows and leading his men to occupy the buildings and wood piles by the jetty. The Bolshevik outpost there was overcome after a short fire fight, and the site secured for the landings. The prisoners taken on the jetty incidentally were found to have been from a White battalion in Archangel that had mutinied and shot their British officers - they were handed over to the White authorities.

One of the first ashore was Boson C.H. Mitchell, who won the Military Cross. His, and other, reports in the London Gazette are given below.....

"This Chief Petty Officer showed great gallantry and devotion to duty during the attack on the village of Rimskaya on 29th August, 1919. He was one of the first to enter the village, personally took twelve of the enemy prisoners and captured one machine gun, which had been delaying the advance. He set a magnificent example of gallantry and coolness."

Eighteen enemy tried to make a stand in woodland around the pier, but were broken up by Able Seaman Logan, an American from New York serving in the Mercantile Marine Reserve.

"On 29th August, 1919, at Rimskaya on Lake Onega, this rating, showed great resource, courage and initiative on the occasion of landing. Together with another man he captured eighteen prisoners who were taking cover in the woods round the pier and who would have held up the advance of the Allied landing party."

 A site on the lake,  probably not Rimskaya, showing the typical buildings and log piles (Library of Congress)

Troops fanned out into the village - one house, unusually, has a horse tied up outside. As the British approached a Red Commissar broke cover and tried to escape, but was captured.

Fire fights broke out all over the village as the Bolsheviks tried to set up machine gun posts. Motorman H. Barker, from Penge, won a Military Cross for overcoming one of these..

"On 29th August, 1919, at Rimskaya, this rating displayed conspicuous zeal and gallantry on the occasion of the storming of the village. Coming under a heavy machinegun cross fire he persevered and then became mainly responsible for the capture of thirty-one prisoners."

The raiders had machine guns of their own, more skilfully handled. Able Seaman J. Buss, from Camberwell, won a bar to the Distinguished Conduct Medal he already possessed, for his part in the battle...

"For conspicuous gallantry and devotion to duty at Rimskaya, on 29th August, 1919, when he advanced with his machine gain under (heavy fine, and' by skillful handling of the same was largely responsible for the capture of 30 prisoners by his section.".

Buss in fact was not a sailor at all, but an ex-Sergeant in the London Regiment, who had won his Distinguished Conduct Medal the previous year.

Another 30 prisoners were also captured by Lt. Walter Wood, who won a Military Cross. All in all 150 prisoners were taken and the operation was a huge success. And meanwhile the RAF had also been in action over the lake, but that's another blog.

Onega & Back Part 2 - To War by Rail

 British troops in Russia in 1919. In this case, on the Archangel front

May 1919 found a small British/White Russian force on the northern shores of Lake Onega in Russia. At described in part 1 they had fought their way down from Murmansk in the Arctic, following the line of the Murmansk - St Petersburg railway, and they were now based in Medvyejya Gora on the lake shore. The officer commanding, General Maynard, already knew that the British troops were to be withdrawn before the winter, his task was to train up a decent Russian army to take their place, and damage Bolshevik forces as much as possible in the meantime.

Most of the land around was marsh and forest, very heavy going. So movement was more or less restricted to the railway line, which could transport troops, and even offer artillary support via naval guns mounted on wagons. Advance or retreat was measured by how far down the line you were to St Petersburg.

Maynard's British contingent had originally consisted of just two companies from the Middlesex and Kings Royal Rifle Regiments, but once on the lake he was reinforced by RAF sea planes and a small naval flotilla manned by the Mercantile Marine Reserve. He also had Italian and Serbian contingents, but the bulk of his forces were Russian. Unfortunately their quality and numbers varied wildly, and in the initial stages it was the British who did most of the fighting.

 Allies - Serbian troops defending part of the Murmansk railway, 1919

Some idea of the action that summer can be obtained from the following excerpt.

The Middlesex Special Company

The "Die Hards" arrived in Murmansk in April 1919, just one company, but an elite one. Number 1 "Special" company was formed of volunteers and almost all were long service veterans. It was commanded by Major C. D. Drew.

 A typical view of the Murmansk Railway in 1915

Their first "active" service was when No. 1 platoon acted as escort of a train of "undesirables" being deported to enemy lines, but on 2nd May 1919 they were sent by train down to "n. 19 Siding" near Lake Vigozero - as was described in part 1, everything in this part of the world moved by the Murmansk Railway, or by water, there was no other serious way of getting around. From May 5th to 15th they stayed in camp at number 19 Siding whilst the other British Company from the KRRC steadily forced their way south along the line. By May 14th the KRRC had reached Siding 13, and it was the Middlesex's turn. They continued the advance along the line, reaching Siding 12 on the 16th, but here they had to wait until the line was repaired. On May 19th the KRRC advanced again, but were almost surrounded and cut off until the Middlesex came to their aid.

 Medvyejya Gora

 As the Middlesex company reached Lake Onega they were accompanied by a correspondent of the New York Times, Arthur Copping, whose report was published on June 2nd 1919. His report describes their advance.

As they grew closer to the lake opposition increased, the Die Hards had seen off a Bolshevik train with rifle grenades, and next day, advancing in their own armoured train they had come under rifle fire., which they had driven off with the 3 inch guns of the train. The day after that, a party of American railroad engineers sent ahead to repair a sabotaged bridge were almost captured, but managed to escape under covering fire from one Middlesex patrol whilst another flanked their position.

After three days and nights with very little sleep, progressing down the line through forest and across broken bridges, the Middlesex company, the KRRC and their Serbian and Italian enemies entered Medvyejya Gora on May 21st. Even then they spent the night on outpost duty on the heights above the town.

There was now time for some R&R before the Middlesex were sent off down the line again.On June 12th the Middlesex  launched a night attack against Siding 10, and had taken it by next morning. From July 6th until 26th they the company garrisoned the village of Kapaselga, sending out patrols and digging trenches, before being sent back to Medvyejya Gora, returning to Kapaselga on the 1st of August. On the 13th Bolsheviks attacked Kapaselga,  but were beaten off.

 The Enemy - a modern re-enactment of a Bolshevik attack

 Siding 8

The last action of the Die Hards took place on August 17th, as recorded in their Regimental Diary (freespace.virgin.net/howard.anderson/russia/russia.htm).

 "Company entrained (at Kapaselga) and left School House at 8 a.m. Detrained at railhead two bridges north of Siding 8. Major Lang, Marines, and one battalion were attached to Company. We attacked along railway line, two platoons on each side. No. 1 Platoon with No. 3 in support on the right, No. 2 with No. 4 in support on the left. Four enemy were seen and fired at in No. 8 Siding and retired on to their main position, where the enemy replied with heavy rifle and machine-gun fire. Firing was more accurate than usual for the ' Bols,' and a good ~ many bullets struck the ground between front and support positions. His position was shelled and Company attacked. His position had been hastily evacuated, and dixies of hot water and burnt pancakes were found; also a large amount of ammunition, several rifles and barbed wire. 

Company advanced again; progress had to coincide with attack of Karelian Company on post road. Patrols were sent to post road to keep touch. Company advanced to Siding 7A, approximately 5 versts south of No. 8 Siding. The enemy blew up bridges as we advanced. On reaching Siding 7A an outpost position was taken up. No. 4 Platoon on right (responsible for railway), No. 3 Platoon on left. No. 2 Platoon returned to No. 8 Siding as escort to guns. No enemy were seen during night. A large fire was observed well in rear of enemy line, which may have been a forest fire. Heavy firing was heard from Vakshozero direction. A patrol was sent to Karelians at junction of post road and track from Siding 7A. Our casualties were nil."

The Company returned to Kapaselga on the 18th, but three hours later left for Medvyejya Gora. On the 20th the Middlesex entrained for Kern where they stayed, away from the front line, before leaving Murmansk for home on the 11th of October.

Onega and Back Pt. 1 - 1919

Why Murmansk?

Why were British troops in Murmansk in the first place? Well, they were partly overtaken by events, partly wildly optimistic.
The British had been supplying their ally, Tsarist Russia, with vast quantities of material aid, much of it via the Artic Ports of Murmansk and Archangel, to avoid the German fleet in the Baltic. Murmansk was basically just a small port, with a railway down to St Petersburg. However, the collapse of Russia in 1917 meant that the advancing Germans could well get all this material for themselves. Even worse, the Bolsheviks could get it!  Another consideration was that Murmansk and Archangel could act as supply bases for White Russian armies, and with Allied help even topple the Reds completely.
Consequently in August 1918 Allied forces took Archangel and Murmansk from the communist forces there, and linking up with White Russians fanned out South West and South East until the Russian winter halted operations in November.

 Murmansk harbour in 1918

By 1919 the situation had changed. Germany had been defeated and there simply wasn't the will to continue another war after the brutal four years of WW1. In 1919 the British commander in Murmansk, General Maynard, was informed unofficially that Allied troops would be withdrawn by the winter of 1919, which was confirmed in July. Murmansk was very much the junior partner to Archangel, which had more fighting, even to the use of British tanks!, and really requires a book in itself. Murmansk though had problems of it´s own, specifically Bolshevik advances up the railway line from St Petersburg (now Petrograd).

Why Lake Onega?

General Maynard, from the front cover of his memoirs, The Murmansk Venture

General Maynard found himself tasked with organising an evacuation in the face of the enemy, never an easy thing to do, as well as training a Russian army to take his place. Rather than patiently waiting for the Bolsheviks to arrive he resolved on a "limited offensive" "to the line Medvyejya Gora- Povyenets at the northern extremity of Lake Onega".
His reasons were as follows;
a) This would block the main route north to Murmansk.
b) It would actually shorten his front line as it would bring him close to the Finnish border, the Finns being anti-Bolshevik
c) (the primary reason given by Maynard) it would open up new areas of recruitment. The Murmansk area was not well populated, and anyway , the people there were "for the most part of a turbulent class, and greatly under the influence of Bolshevik propaganda". In contrast areas to the south were more populous, and "strongly anti- Bolshevik in sentiment".

Forces

Many of Maynards British troops had been diverted to Archangel, which left him with;

 Two companies of British Regulars, the 1st Special Company of the Middlesex Regiment formed almost entirely of NCOs and long service veterans, and a company of the Kings Royal Rifle Corps.
An Italian battalion
A Serbian battalion
A Finnish legion - these were Finnish communists who had originally been recruited to fight the Germans. They were not so keen fighting the Bolsheviks
Various Russian units including the Olonetz Regiment.

So in March advance forces were sent out and several villages along the railway line were secured. What held them up was agitation in Murmansk, mainly stirred up by the Red Finns with the aim of staging a revolution and combining with Bolshevik forces to the south. Fortunately this was detected in time, stamped on, and the Bolsheviks to the south driven off after a battle at Urosozero.

The Advance to Lake Onega

The Murmansk Railway bridge over the River Suma 1915 (from an amazing collection at the US Library of Congress)

On May 1st the Allies moved south towards Lake Onega, in three columns - "The right column, consisting of locally enlisted troops under British officers, was directed to clear the western and southern shores of Lake Segozero and protect the right flank of the force. The centre column, composed mainly of British, troops, was ordered to advance rapidly down the railway; whilst the left column, which consisted almost entirely of Russian troops, protected the left flank." (From General Maynard's report in the London Gazette).

The railway was absolutely crucial to the whole campaign. Maynard describes the terrain that spring and summer....
"The Murmansk-Petrograd railway, consisting of a single line, is the main channel of communication through the area. It is extremely vulnerable owing to the large number of wooden bridges which carry it over the waterways, and the wholesale destruction of these by the enemy during his retreat impeded the pursuit of the centre column and added greatly to the difficulties of supplying its advanced posts.The maintenance of the flank columns presented even greater difficulties, however, since all supplies and ammunition had to be conveyed for over 100 miles by tracks wholly unsuited to wheeled transport, and along which every bridge and culvert had been destroyed.

Operations were necessarily confined almost entirely to the attack and defence of localities covering such roads and tracks as were in existence, the enemy usually occupying entrenched positions, the flanks of which rested on a lake or marsh. The difficulty of carrying positions of this nature without undue sacrifice was increased by the impossibility of employing any considerable force of artillery. With the centre column, however, field guns were employed on railway mountings constructed in the local workshops and proved of great assistance.
The absence of aircraft during this advance was felt severely."

A typical stretch of the Murmansk Railway, 1915 (Library of Congress)

The first objective was Meselskaya, occupied by the centre column on May 3rd after 48 hours of fighting, the Red forces being driven south, and the left column establishing itself 20 miles to the east, again after heavy fighting. After a few days rest the columns moved off once more, reaching within 5 miles of Medvyejya Gora on May 15th, though only entering the town 6 days later after an attack by all the allies and an outflanking move by the right column to the west. Meanwhile the left column occupied Povyenets on May 18th after several days of fighting.

Lake Onega

The capture of Medvyejya Gora opened up many more options for Maynards forces, not least the establishment of an RAF seaplane (Fairey F III C) base and a small naval flotilla on the lake. The recommence range suddenly increased massively, as did the strike power. Additionally, recruitment to the new Russian forces improved and schools of instruction were formed to train the new troops, as well as the raising of partisans along the eastern shore. Some Russian troops were sent by boat with rifles and ammunition to arm the population of the Sunga peninsula to the west. The allies even made contact, briefly, with Finnish troops on their western flank.

Maynard´s main preoccupation was still with the quality of his Russian troops, especially when they failed to break through to the Shunga peninsula and the job had to be taken by the British. To counter this he determined to move further south, into a more anti-Bolshevik area -this and the small victories required to get there, apparently "had a most salutary effect on the Russian forces, which from now onwards showed a steady improvement in discipline and fighting capacity." By July 5th the Allies held a line Svartnavolotski—Tivdiya—Kyapeselga— Shunga.

July saw worrying events with a revolt of the Russian troops at Archangel and Red reinforcements driving the Finns back, but for the Murmansk forces things were looking good. The Russian forces to the east of the lake and on the Shunga peninsula were doing well, and the small lake flotilla was dominating their much larger Bolshevik opponents, not least by capturing several of their ships. Maynard decided his best policy was to stay where he was, but raid aggressively around Lake Onega to keep the enemy off balance, and that's what he did.

The British view of the Baltic, 1919. Part 2.

June 1919 found Admiral Cowan´s First Light Cruiser Squadron of the Royal Navy based at Bjorko harbour in Finland, monitoring the Bolshevik fleet bottled up in Kronstadt. The aim was to stop it intervening in the newly independent Baltic states, or even in the German Revolution raging at the time. However, there was something of a stalemate, as Kronstadt harbour was well protected by minefields and forts covering the entrance. There was also a danger from German units to the south, supposedly there to oppose the Bolsheviks, but suspected of having an agenda of their own.

 Some of the crew of HMS Caledon

Admiral Cowan´s report, as printed in the London Gazette continues as follows.....

30. It was evident by then that the Bolshevik Active Squadron consisted of:  ...
2 Battleships. (1 Dreadnought " Petropavlovsk"), 1 Cruiser, "Oleg" and 6 Large Destroyers.
31. Up to about the end of June there were constant attempts by Enemy Light Craft to break out on the Northern side at night, and both to sweep and lay mines - and a good deal of shooting, though little hitting, went on between the Patrols - also, there is no doubt more mines were laid by the Bolsheviks, to the Southward of Stirs Point, and to the Eastward of the existing Mine Barrier.

32. On the 13th June very heavy firing broke out between Fort Krasnaya Gorka and the fort and ships at Kronstadt - Fort Krasnaya Gorka having suddenly turned over to the "Whites", who, however, were not strong enough to hold it - the forces immediately available being only a hundred or so of badly-armed and much-exhausted Ingermanlanders, who, owing to the fire from the Bolshevik Heavy Ships, were unable to occupy the Fort long enough either to effectively man the guns, or destroy them - and so, after changing hands twice, Krasnaya Gorka remained in Bolshevik hands.
33. These Ingermanlanders were fighting under the direction of the Estonian Command, and were armed and equipped by them, chiefly from supplies captured from Bolsheviks, and had done very well ever since these operations started, and were fighting with the more enthusiasm as it was their own country they were freeing.
Apparently, however, their successes aroused the suspicion and jealousy of the Russians of the Northern Corps, who, equipped and supported in every way by the Esthonians, had by then begun to become a considerable fighting force, and were holding the line on the right of the Estonian-Ingermanland Force - whose left flank rested on the sea, and had pushed forward as far as Krasnaya Gorka.

34. In order to deal with any attempt by heavy ships to break out - as well as to maintain an effective patrol on the entrance to Petrograd Bay, I considered it advisable to lay mines so as to restrict the movements of the enemy, and this was done by"'Princess Margaret" (Captain Harry H. Smyth, C.M.G.,D.S.O.) and the 20th Destroyer Flotilla (Captain Berwick Curtis, C.B., D.S.O.).
35. On 17th June our lookouts reported a Cruiser ("Oleg") and two Destroyers left anchor West of Kronstadt, and also a Submarine moving Westward.
36. A few minutes after midnight a sudden burst of firing was heard by our outpost Destroyers, which, as suddenly ceased, and next day Lieutenant Augustine W. Agar, .R.N., informed me that he had torpedoed the Cruiser "Oleg" at anchor, the torpedo hitting her about the foremost funnel, and came under heavy fire from the Destroyers on retiring.
37. On the 6th July "Vindictive" on passage from England to join me in the Gulf of Finland, ran aground outside Reyal on the Middle Ground Shoal, and remained there for eight days. It was a time of some anxiety to me, as she was going fifteen knots at the time of striking, and had slid up half her length, and was in two feet six inches to three feet less water there than her draught, and in a tideless sea. " Delhi" and "Cleopatra" made several ineffectual attempts to tow her off before after lightening her by 2,212 tons, and experiencing a rise of water of about four to six inches due to a Westerly wind, "Cleopatra' at last pulled her clear after eight days of effort and, as we discovered shortly afterwards, all the towing operations were carried out in the middle of a minefield.

 Recovering a plane after a bombing raid

38. Early in July strong attacks were made by the Bolsheviks on the Russian front on the Southerly shore, necessitating frequent bombardments by light Cruisers and destroyers of the Bolshevik positions. Bolshevik aircraft were also active; Fort Krasuaya Gorka also occasionally firing at our patrol in Kaporia Bay.
39. Later in the mouth our Flying Operations started, consisting at first of reconnaissance and photographic flights, and then on the morning of the 30th July a bombing operation against the ships in Kronstadt, the main objective being a Destroyer Depot Ship with five or six Destroyers lying alongside her. The whole was under the command of Squadron Leader David G. Donald, A.F.C., R.A.F.
Sixteen bombs in all were dropped, and one hit, at any rate, was registered on the Depot Ship, which disappeared from her accustomed position in the harbour, and was not seen again. All machines returned safely after passing through a heavy anti-aircraft fire from the ships and batteries defending Kronstadt.
40. Thereafter continued a close watch on Petrograd Bay, with frequent bombardments by us of Bolshevik positions on the Southern Shore, and occasional shellings by Fort Krasnaya Gorka and other guns, varied by attacks by enemy submarines on our vessels, and intermittent activity by Bolshevik Destroyers and Minesweepers, with occasional appearances outside the harbour by larger craft.

41. On the morning of 18th August, with the object of removing, as far as possible, the threat which existed to my ships and also to the Left Flank of the Russian advance to Petrograd by the presence of the Bolshevik Active Squadron, an attack on the ships in Krronstadt by Coastal Motor Boats and Aircraft was made.
42. The position of the ships in the harbour had been ascertained by aerial photographs. Frequent bombing raids on the harbour had also been made at varying times in the weeks beforehand.
43. The attack was planned so that all available aircraft co-operated under Squadron Leader D. G. Donald, A.F.C., R.A.F., and that they should arrive and bomb the harbour so as to drown the noise of the approach of the Coastal Motor Boats.
44. The time-table was most accurately carried out; with, the result that the first three Coastal Motor Boats, under Commander Claude C. Dobson, D.S.O., passed the line of Forts and entered the harbour with scarcely a shot being fired.
45. Each boat had a definite objective - six in all. Of these six enterprises four were achieved, the results being gained not only by dauntless disciplined bravery at the moment of attack, but by strict attention to said rehearsal of, every detail beforehand by every member of the personnel, both of the boats and also of the Air Force;
46. Of the latter there is this, to say, that though all their arrangements for bombing were makeshift, and their aerodrome, from which the land machines had to rise in the dark, was a month before a wilderness of trees and rocks, and in size is quite inadequate, not one of the machines (sea and land) failed to keep to its time-table, or to lend the utmost and most effective support during, and after, the attack to the Coastal Motor Boats.
47. After this nothing bigger than a Destroyer ever moved again, but a certain amount of mine-laying and sweeping was observed near the approaches to the harbour.

 The wreck of the Pamiet Azov in Kronstadt harbour

48. During (September) our ships constantly bombarded Bolshevik positions on the Southern Shore in Kaporia, Bay, in support of the Esthomian Left Flank, whilst the aircraft were employed in bombing Kronstadt and attacking their small craft whenever seen.

49. Early in October the long talked of advance against Petrograd by General Yudenifcch began - but as his left flank was not made secure by making the capture of Forts Erasnaya Gorka and Saraia Lochad his first objective - as was repeatedly urged - the attempt failed.
50. The Esthonians, so long as their advance was such that the guns of the light cruisers and destroyers of the Biorko Force could support them, went forward - but thereafter they met with strong and effective resistance and much barbed wire, and were held up within four miles of the land approaches to Fort Krasnaya Gorka and suffered very heavy losses - equal to nearly one-third of their forces, which did not at the beginning exceed two thousand men.
51. It was after this check that "Erebus" (Captain John A. Moreton, D.S.O.) arrived (24th October), which encouraged Admiral Pitka, who was in command of the Esthonian Forces, to try again; but by then the Russians had begun to fall back, thereby uncovering the Esthonian right flank and causing them further distress, and dispersion of their few remaining effectives.
The Russians and Esthonians then fell back with considerable rapidity as far west as the line Narva - Peipus Lake, and I devoted myself to endeavouring to ensure that, from the sea, no further attempt was made to further harass these very war-weary and dispirited troops.
52. Unfortunately the "Erebus" (Captain John A. Moreton, D.S.O.) arrived only after the attempt was doomed to failure, and by that time also the weather had broken, making it very unsuitable for flying in order to direct the firing of "Erebus" ; also our machines and many of the pilots were, from hard service through the summer, rather past their best. The type of machine, too (Short Seaplane), was unable to get sufficient height to avoid the very severe and accurate anti-aircraft fire from these two forts.
53. All that could be done by our ships (light cruisers and destroyers) besides "Erebus" in the way of shelling positions and covering the advance, was done, and always within the range of Fort Krasnaya's Gorka's twelve-inch guns, and under the observation of its kite balloon; although they have constantly shelled us, have never succeeded further than to land a few splinters on board.

54. On the 30th October arrived, out from England General Sir Richard Haking and a small staff of officers, who, after investigating and acquiring what appeared to ine to be a very complete grasp of the whole Baltic situation and its needs, returned to England after two weeks.

55. Towards the beginning of October and concurrently with the attempt on Petrograd by the Russian North-West Army, the German- Russian threat against Riga became acute, and a bombardment of the town commenced. "Abdiel " (Captain Berwick Curtis, C.B., D.S.O.) and " Vanoc " (Commander Edward O. Tudor, R.N.) were there at the time, also a French destroyer ("L'Aisne"), "Dragon" (Captain Francis A. Marten, C.M.G., C.V.O.) was on her way out from England and I therefore diverted her there.

Prince Avaloff Bermont

56. Owing to the situation in the Gulf of Finland and the necessity of supporting the advance of the Esthonians on the left flank of the Russian Army, I was unable to leave those waters myself, and so requested Commodore Brisson, the French Senior Naval Officer, who had by then proceeded to Riga, to take charge of the operations there, and to open fire on all positions within range on the the left bank of the Dvina River, at the expiration of the time given in my ultimatum to Prince Avaloff Bermont, who was ostensibly in command of the troops occupying those positions, and attacking Riga.
57. This Commodore Brisson most faithfully and effectively did at noon on the 15th October, apparently much to the surprise of Bermont, who had, in reply to my ultimatum, stated that he was friendly to the Allies and was only resisting Bolshevism, and disowned all connection with the Germans, and whose forces, were in position and with little shelter, in some places less than one thousand yards from ours, and the French ships, Bermont having evidently assumed that his statements and .arguments were sufficient to hoodwink me and delay our offensive action.
58. This enabled the Lettish troops to cross the river in strength and with great enthusiasm after twenty-six days fighting, to sweep away all these Russo-Germah forces from within striking distance of Riga and out of Mitau - which had been the German main base and headquarters throughout the year - Tukkum and the Windau district.
59. On about the 30th October the threat to.Libau by German troops became serious, and I sent directions to Captain Lawrence L. Dundas, C.M.G., the senior naval officer there, to, with the help of the British Military Mission, get into co-operation with the Lettish Defence Forces, establish communications and observation posts and plot targets, and sent ''Dauntless" (Captain Cecil Horace Pilcher) down from Biorko to reinforce, and shortly afterwards "Erebus" also, as by this time General Yudenitch was falling back from before Petrograd, and therefore the need for bombarding Fort Krasnaya Gorka had ceased.
60. On the 14th October a very heavy attack on Libau commenced and the Germans succeeded in occupying the outer fixed defences of the town, but after eight hours hard fighting by the Lettish troops and incessant bombardment by the British ships they were thrown, back again with very heavy losses.
61. The ammunition question at the end of this day was of some anxiety to me, two vessels having fired the whole of their outfits and other being very short. An ammunition ship was on her way down from Riga at the moment—" Galatea," homeward bound .with General Sir R. Haking. on board, and also two destroyers were in the vicinity, so all were ordered in to replenish the Libau force with their ammunition. No further attack of any weight however was made, and the crisis passed.
62. With regard to these two attacks on Riga, and Libau, it is unquestionable that the German intention was to frustrate by every means in their power any successful attack on Petrograd and Kronstadt, and to gain a footing for the winter in the Baltics Provinces with a view to overwhelming them, and then to drive on to Petrograd.

 Defemsive positions in Riga, Nov 1919

63. I had constant rumours that the Dreadnought Battleship "Sevastopol" had been prepared for, and was in every way fit for, service - also, there was ever-recurring Submarine activity - and by my reckoning there were still two large Destroyers available as well, though two had been destroyed by our mines during the operations in support of Yudenitch whilst attempting to come out and attack our patrols at night.
64. The work of the Destroyers was, as ever, tireless, dauntless, and never ending, and with never the relaxation of lying in a defended port with fires out and full rations, and all their work in cramped navigational waters (necessitating the almost constant presence on deck of the Captain, and, in the case of the Petrograd Bay '" Biorko " Patrol, always within the range, and often under the fire, of the twelve-inch guns from Fort Krasnaya Gorka.
65. This patrolling of Petrograd Bay, though generally in smooth water, was arduous and anxious always, because there was no room to manoeuvre East or West—there were mines in each direction—much foul ground, unindicated by the charts, and the charting of the Southern, Shore disagreed by a mile of longitude with that of the Northern - also for that small space, (six by twenty miles), bounded on the West by Seskar, and on the East by the minefields, three charts had to be in use.
66. In the whole of that area no shoals (and there are many), were marked by anything better than a spar buoy. When the winter came on, with incessant snow and fog throughout the long sixteen-hour nights, I scarcely hoped that the Destroyers could succeed in maintaining their stations without frequent and serious groundings or collisions, and the fact that they did is sufficient witness of the spirit that was in these two Flotillas—the First, "Captain George W. McO. Campbell, and the Second, 'Captain
Colin K.. MacLean, reinforced by some of the Third Flotilla also, under the command of Commander Aubrey T. Tillard, in "Mackay".
The energy, care and forethought which these two officers constantly displayed in order to maintain the efficiency of their Flotillas, I must always bear in most grateful admiration and remembrance.
The boats were always in "watch and watch" - i.e., as often at sea as in harbour, and very frequently under harder conditions.

67. At the beginning of the campaign the enemy's active Naval Force appeared to be -
2 Battleships (1 Dreadnought "Petfopavlovsk", 1 "Andrei Pervozvanni")
1 Cruiser ("Oleg"),
5 Destroyers ("Novik" class),
2 to 4 Submarines, and perhaps 4 smaller coal-burning Torpedo Boats, besides Minesweepers.
68. Of these -
2 Battleships ("Petropavloysk" and "Andrei Pervozvanni") were torpedoed and disabled in Kronstadt Harbour, and have not moved since - except "Andrei Pervozvanni" into dock.
1 Cruiser ("Oleg") was torpedoed and sunk at her moorings off Kronstadt.
3 Destroyers ("Novik" class), "Azard", "Gavril" and "Constantin" were sunk, two of them by our mines, the other either by mine or torpedo.
1 Patrol Vessel (armed), " Kitoboi", which surrendered on the night of 14th-15th June,
and, I think,
2 Submarines, one by depth charge and the other by mine.
Besides this -
1 Oiler was bombed and badly damaged.
A number of Motor Launches were set on fire and destroyed,
and .
1 Submarine Depot Ship ("Pamiet Azov") was torpedoed and sunk, all in Kronstadt Harbour.
An Oil Fuel Store and a very large quantity of wood and coal fuel was also burnt.
69. Against this our losses have been :
1 Submarine ("L.55") mined and sunk.
1 Destroyer ("Verulam") mined and sunk.
1 Destroyer ("Vittoria") torpedoed and sunk by enemy submarine.
2. Mine-sweeping Sloops ("Gentian" and "Myrtle") mined and sunk.
3 Coastal Motor Boats sunk during the attack 'on Kronstadt.
2 Coastal Motor Boats blown up; unserviceable.
2 Coastal Motor Boats and 2 Motor Launches sunk through stress of weather whilst in tow.
1 Store Carrier ("Volturnous") mined and sunk.
1 Light' Cruiser' ("Curacoa") mined and salved.
1 Paddle Mine-sweeper ("Banbury" mined and salved.
1 Motor Launch (M.L.156) mined and salved.
1 Admiralty Oiler ("War Expert") mined and salved.
1 Mine-layer ("Princess Margaret") damaged 'by mine.
70.—The losses of.personnel have been:
Killed.
Royal Navy .. ... 16 Officers. 97 Men...
Royal Air Force ... 4 Officers. 1 Man.
Total 20 Officers. 98 Men..

71. My aim was throughout the year to prevent any Bolshevik warships breaking out into.the Gulf of Finland - and the ice has now relieved me of this responsibility - and also to frustrate by every means the most evident design of the Germans to overrun and. dominate the Baltic Provinces and then to advance Petrograd, and their repulse from both Riga and Libau in October and November by the Lettish troops under cover of the bombardment of our ships has, I think, put an end to this also, and all German troops were back into Prussia by 15th December.
I have the honour to be,
Sir,
Your obedient servant,
WALTER COWAN,
Rear-Admiral Commanding First Light
Cruiser Squadron.

The British view of the Baltic, 1919. Part 1

The British intervention in the Russian Civil War was not a great success - after all, the Reds won. However, one place where they did some good was in the Baltic. The Royal Naval commander there during 1919 was Rear Admiral Walter Cowan. This is his official report.

 London Gazette
6th April 1920

"Delhi" at Devonport,
SIR,
1. I have the honour to forward herewith this my report on my year's Service in Command of His Majesty's Naval Forces in the Baltic, where I relieved Rear-Admiral Sir Edwyn S. Alexander-Sinclair, K.C.B., M.V.O., on .the 6th January, 1919.

2. When I arrived the German situation was as.follows: German troops were nominally in occupation of Latvia, with Headquarters at Libau.
The Bolsheviks were in Riga, and gradually advancing South and West
The German Troops were of low morale, and in a poor state of discipline - and wherever the Bolsheviks advanced the Germans fell back, in many cases handing over arms and munitions to the Bolsheviks on their retirement.
3. The Bolsheviks had by the middle of February advanced so far as Windau, and were also within forty miles from Libau from the Westward.
4. I therefore in "Caledon " (Commander Henry S. M. Harrison-Wallace, R.N.) shelled them out of Windau; and made what preparations I could to evacuate the refugees from Libau, as I did not consider an indiscriminate shelling of the town in the event of its occupation by the Bolsheviks would be advisable if no troops were available to land for its reoccupation.

5. Shortly after this (at the end of February), large German reinforcements began to arrive by sea, and General-Major Graf Von. der Goltz assumed command. at Libau, and very soon afterwards stabilised the situation, and drove the Bolsheviks well East again - and this, so far, was satisfactory.
6. In the meantime the Letts - under the direction of M^. Ulmanis, the Acting President. - were making every endeavour to raise and equip a sufficient military force - aided by a. limited quantity of small arms and machine guns - to enable them to undertake the defence of their own country against the Bolsheviks when the time should come for the Germans to withdraw. It soon became evident, however, that it was not the Germans' intention to permit any Lettish Force being raised, and constant cases of friction, oppression and disarmament of Lettish Troops began to occur
7. The climax was reached on the 16th April, when at the Naval Harbour - where the Headquarters of the Lettish Troops were - German troops raided these Headquarters, arrested and disarmed all the Officers, and looted money and documents, killing and wounding several Lettish soldiers. Simultaneously with this, in the town of Libau itself, Baltic-German troops arrested those members of the Lettish Government who were unable to escape them, whilst the rest took refuge on board His Majesty's ships, and
M. Ulmanis, the Acting President, with the British Mission, which consequently was surrounded by Baltic-German sentries.
8. That night two young Baltic-German Officers came off to my ship and announced that they were the Heads of the Committee of Safety until the formation of a new Government, and asked me if I could guarantee them the support of His Majesty's Government in this movement.
I pointed out to them that until I had some satisfactory explanation for the events of the day I could listen to and recognise no such proposals.
I then sent them on shore again and heard nothing more of them.

Libau 1919

9. On my requiring an explanation from Von der Goltz for these happenings, he denied all responsibility or knowledge for them, saying that his troops were out of hand, and that the Baltic-Germans were not under his orders.
10. In consequence of this I called a meeting of the Allied representatives, and with them demanded the following from Von der Gdltz;
First. - That the unit which raided the Lettish Headquarters should be at once removed from the Libau district.
Second. - That the Commanding Officer of the offending Baltic-German Unit be relieved of his command.
We also gave him the time and date by which we required the fulfilment of these demands.
11. Both were complied with within the time, but Von der Goltz stated that as he considered the Lettish Government to be Bolshevik and a danger to the district he was administering by order of the Allies, he could not agree to their release from arrest, or the continuance of their functions.
12. This state of affairs was reported to Paris accordingly, and a very few days afterwards, owing to the melting of the ice, and signs of activity by the Bolshevik Fleet, I had myself to proceed, to the Gulf of Finland, and Commodore Arthur A. M. Duff, C.B., arrived on the 29th May and took charge of affairs in the Western Baltic; and thereafter, by his quick and accurate grasp of the whole German situation there, freed me from a very considerable portion of my preoccupations.
It is hard for me to do justice on paper to the adequacy and effectiveness of his administration until he left for England again on the 28th September. I have now transferred to him the duties of Senior Naval Officer in the Baltic.

13.. On arrival in the Gulf of Finland and reviewing the situation, my hope and intention was - as soon as ice conditions allowed it - to move as far East as possible in order to support the left flank of the Esthonian Front, and to protect it from any attempt at being turned from the sea.
14. After getting into touch with the Esthonian Naval and Military Authorities, I went over to Helsingfors to call on the Regent (General G. Mannerheim), and also to congratulate the Finns on the recognition of the independence, which had been announced the previous day. Circumstances then obliged me to return to Libau for a day on the 12th May.
15. I had previously - on the 7th May - shifted my flag from " Caledon" to "Curacoa," On returning from Libau to Reval on the 13th May " Curacoa " struck a mine, which disabled her from further service and occasioned eleven casualties amongst her personnel.

 HMS Caledon

16. I therefore shifted to " Cleopatra," and left Reval the next morning for the Eastward, and, from the 14th May onwards I lay - first in Narva Bay for a few days reconnoitring as far as Kaporia whilst the Esthonians were landing and operating between there and Louga - and then, as they established themselves further East, I moved forward to Seskar.
from which place, with the very good visibility prevailing day after day, I was able from the mast head to keep an effective watch on Petrograd Bay.

17. The situation then was somewhat of an anxiety to me, as the strength of the Bolshevik. Naval Forces was known to include Armoured Ships - the Esthonians were lying in Kaporia with 1 unarmed Transport (including the Nekmangrund Light Vessel, so hard up were they for ships), an old,  slow ex-Russian Gunboat " Bobr," and one ex-Russian Destroyer, dependent on me for fuel, of which I had then, only a limited supply - and my own Force consisted only of "Cleopatra " and four Destroyers, the Seventh Submarine Flotilla arriving shortly afterwards at Reval.
18. From then onwards I maintained a watch on the Bay, whilst the Esthonians were constantly in contact with the Bolshevik Troops, bombarding and pushing forward here and there, and landing more men, whilst relieving those who needed refit, always under the direction of Admiral John Pitka, who, before the War, was a Shipowner of Reval and Director of a Salvage Company, but who assumed command of the Esthonian Naval Forces last winter, and has always shown a most correct instinct for war, both on land and sea. He has since been decorated by His Majesty.

19. On the 17th May a great deal of smoke was observed over Kromstadt; and on the 18th five Bolshevik craft, led by a large Destroyer of the "Avtroil" type came as far West as Dolgoi Nos, five miles clear of the Petrogriad Minefields, and then while still close under the land turned back. So in "Cleopatra" (Captain Charles James Colebrooke Little, C.B) with " Shakespeare " (Commander, now Captain, Frederick Edward Ketelbey Strong, D.S.O.), " Scout " (Lieutenant-Commander Edmund F. Fitzgerald), and " Walker " (Lieutenant-Commander Ambrose T. N.), I went ahead full speed from Seskar on an Easterly course, closing the range rapidly from 20,000 to 16,000 yards when fire was opened, the Bolshevik Destroyer, flying a very large red flag, firing the first shot. I stood on until within half a mile of the mined area, and came under the fire of the Grey Horse Battery, but by this time the range was opening and spotting very difficult, owing to the vessels being close under the land all the time.
20. The speed of the enemy appeared to be reduced to about ten knots, one good hit on the Destroyer at any rate was observed, but under the circumstances I did not consider it advisable to run in over the minefields and under the guns of the shore batteries in order to obtain a decision, and so these craft made good their escape.
21. To the Eastward, but not taking part in the action, was a three-funnelled Cruiser, the "Oleg," and to the Eastward of her again was smoke - and it was reported that the Bolshevik Dreadnought Battleship "Petropavlovsk" was also out.

22. On the 24th May General Sir Hubert Gough arrived in "Galatea" on a special Mission to Finland and the Baltic States, and I accompanied him over to Helsingfors to assist at his ceremonial landing, and to salute him there, and went with him to interview the Finnish authorities, thereafter leaving again for the Eastward, leaving " Galatea" at Helsingfors.

 HMS Walker

23. On the 31st May, whilst still lying off Seskar in "Cleopatra" with "Dragon" (Captain Francis Arthur Marten, C.M.G., C.V.O.), "Galatea" (Captain Charles Morton Forbes, D.S.O.), " Wallace" (Captain George William McOran Campbell), "Voyager" (Lieutenant-Commander Charles Gage Stuart, D'.S.C.), "Vanessa" (Lieutenant- Commander Edward Osborne Broadley, D.S.O.), "Wryneck" (Commander Ralph Vincent Eyre, E..N.), "Versatile" (Commander Gerald Wynter, O.B.E.), "Vivacious" (Commander Claude L. Bate, R.N.), and with "Walker" and two Submarines on patrol, a Bolshevik Destroyer was sighted coming West with a Dreadnought Battleship, and two other small craft behind the minefields. The Destroyer was engaged by "Walker" and chased Eastwards, the Battleship opening a heavy and well-controlled fire at the same time.
24. On the first report I weighed and steamed East, a Bolshevik aeroplane appearing overhead and dropping bombs among my force as it advanced, but it flew off Eastwards on being fired at.
25. The Destroyer fell back on the battleship, which manoeuvred behind the minefields and kept up a heavy and well-disciplined fire on "Walker" as she fell back to meet me;
Fort Krasnaya Gorka having a kite balloon up and firing also.
26. I stood up and down the edge of the minefield, but the Bolshevik Force showed no intention of coming on, and retired Eastwards after a few salvoes had been fired.
27. "Walker " was hit twice, but no appreciable damage was done, and there was one slight casualty only.
28. It now became apparent to me that with the small forces at my disposal it would be necessary, in order to keep an effective watch on Bolshevik Naval movements, and in particular to, if possible, ensure that no mines were laid to the Westward of the existing fields across the entrance to Petrograd Bay, that I should.have a Base nearer to Kronstadt than Reyal.
29. I therefore moved to Biorko, and required certain assistance from the Finns in the way of patrols and accommodation on shore agreed to by them.

Estonian cavalry

Compared to the large cavalry armies of the East, Estonia seems to have had remarkably few cavalry. For example, at the battle of Cesis in June 1919 they had only 65 with 6,500 infantry, whereas the German Frei Korps had 500-600 for about the same number of infantry. When the 1st Cavalry Regiment had been formed in December 1918 most of the officers had had no cavalry training in the Tsarist forces, and many of the men could not even ride.

Estonian cavalry 1919 (The Estonian War Museum - General Laidoner Museum)

By May 1919 there were two cavalry regiments, the 1st with 4 squadrons, the 2nd with 3, and both with machine gun and signal detachments, about 900 men. There were differences though, the best trained, and motivated, men had joined the 1st Regiment when it was formed, so that throughout the war it performed much better than the 2nd Regiment, and had higher morale. In May, both cavalry regiments were attached to the 3rd Division, so the the 1st and 2nd Divisions had no cavalry formations at all. By October the 1st Regiment had been transferred to the 2nd Division, but the 1st still had none.

Instead, cavalry were attached to other units, so that each infantry regiment had a cavalry detachment of about 20-30 men (a Ratsakomando) for scouting. Gradually the numbers increased, so when the 7th Infantry Regiment was formed in December 1919 it had about 80 cavalry out of 1,714 men, as well as a ski/ cyclist platoon.

An Estonian armoured train in the forest

Companies also operated in conjunction with armoured trains (Soomusrongide divisjoni eskadrons), which were quite a feature of warfare in the area. The Estonians had pioneered the use of attachments of infantry and cavalry in this regard - the infantry, heavily equipped with automatic weapons, could hold areas, whilst the cavalry could scout around a prevent unpleasant surprises.

An example comes from the reminiscences of Willem Rakfeldt, leader of the cavalry troop on No. 3 armoured train, which took part in the liberation of Tartu in 1919. The line to Tartu was held by Latvian units, and other trains had been repeatedly held up by partisans cutting the track.

"We were ten men at the disposal of the commander of the train. Several of our horses were captured from the enemy. Our horsemen moved ahead on both sides of the train and we saw a lot of Reds but they did not break the rails in front of us.
I sent two young men on horseback to gather intelligence. However they were made prisoner. They were placed in a pig sty and locked in. But the boys managed to break out and escape to the forest. They were shot at, but manged to evade and fortunately came back to us unscathed.

 The attack on Tartu

Armoured trains 1 and 3 went on towards Tartu. A few kilometres from the city we left the train and circled around to enter the city from the left. The Reds were retiring and setting fire to the city. Locals immediately directed us to the Kreditklassa building where prisoners were held in the basement. We reached there at the same time as men from No. 1 train. We opened the basement door and saw terrible images. People were lying on the floor and on top of each other, still warm and bloody. We found one man who was wounded and had multiple leg wounds. He survived."
http://vapsid.weebly.com/artur-sirk.html

Estonian armour, 1919

During 1919 the small republic of Estonia had to fight for it´s existence against vastly superior numbers of Bolshevik Russians coming from the North and East, and then German Frei Korps from the South. With help from the British Royal Navy, and many volunteers from the Scandinavian countries, especially Finland, they somehow survived.

The Estonians didn´t inherit much from Tsarist Russia. The only destroyer in their fleet had been captured by the British from the Bolsheiks, and they had no armoured cars. They did however have a factory in Taliin, the Federal Foundary, and they resolved to make their own.

The first, the "Tasuja", was built on a Renault chassis and rushed into action against the Bolsheviks in the winter of 1918/9. Unfortunately it got stuck on a damaged bridge during a battle in March and was consequently destroyed.

The next two designs were the "Estonia" and the "Wahur", the latter based on a Packhard lorry chassis. They were rapidly send into action in March 1919, but the "Estonia" was found to be two heavy for the winter roads, and was restricted to Tallinn, though in the summer it was sent south, and by the autumn it had managed to get to Narva to take part in the defence against the Red Army.

 The "Estonia"

There was also the "Vanapagan", based on a Delahaye (2-ton) chassis. It was described at the time as looking as though the armour had been added by a village blacksmith, and Vanapagan was a clumsy giant in Estonian folklore, but it was effective enough.

By now the Estonians were experienced enough to develop a standard design of armoured car, though armoured truck would be more appropriate. Based on an AEC 3 ton chassis, each had a 37mm automatic gun in the turret, two rear facing MGs and a Madsen LMG to the front. The armour was 6-10 mm thick and they weighed up to 8 tons! We are not talking mass production here, they were individually made, and each had a name. Apparently the cars were so noisy when driving that it was almost impossible for the crew to shout to each other.

"Toonela" - complted in April 1919 and on active duty April 22nd
"Kalewipoeg"- completed April 1919, on active duty April 25th. The Kalewipoeg was commaned by a         Swedish volunteer, Einar Lundburg, of which more anew.
"Wibuane" - completed April 1919, and on active duty April 23rd
"Kotkasilm" -  completed January 1920.
"Erilane" - completed January 1920, later renamed "Lembit"

In 1919 the Estonians captured two "proper" ex-Russian army cars, which they renamed the "Tasuja 2" and "Suur Tõll". These were Austin-Putilovs, each with two 7.62mm Maxim MGs in two turrets.

 The Tasuja 2

There was also a Peerless anti-aircraft car, captured by the Finnish volunteer regiment Pohjan Pojat on the 14th March 1919 and donated, willingly or not, to the Estonians in April, where it was renamed the "Pisuhänd". These were basically Peerless trucks adapted by the British to carry a machine gun and pom pom gun, and used by the Russian army as anti-aircraft guns. Even by the standards of the day it was considered slow and heavy, with poor off road performance, but reliable

During summer the cars were painted olive-green , in winter grey/white or just grey, to blend into the inevitable snow. Nonetheless, the name was invariably painted on the side in large letters!

Operation

Although they had pretty good armour and firepower, the Estonian armoured cars were not well suited to cross country travel, especially in the deep Baltic winter. Mostly, they had to stick to roads and were used for patrols behind the front line. Nonetheless, when they could be used they were often effective.

i) Fighting the Frei Corps

The "Estonia", "Toonela" and "Vanapagan"  were part of the reinforcements sent to the Southern front in June 1919, to resist the pro-German Frei Corps, the "Vanapagan" attached to the 6th Regiment.

On June 20th 1919, near Riga, the Germans launched attacks all along the front. All day these were resisted, but at about 5 pm the Vilandi Cadets were finally forced to retreat from the mansion they had been defending, and the way was open to Stolben. At this moment the commander, Lt. Col Reek, committed his reserve, the “Estonia” and “Toonela” together with an assault detachment on an armoured train. The "Estonia" carried on down the road whilst the "Toonela" peeled off and moved amongst estate outbuildings. This drove back the attack, although even then infantry from the assault company werer needed to fill the line, as the armoured cars could not traverse the terrain. Further attacks were made but the front had been stabilised.

 The "Vanapagan"

The "Vanapagan", and a handful of infantry from the sappers of the 6th Regiment, skirmished with some Red Latvian infantry & cavalry on the 21s,t but it didn't amount to much and they returned to the Murmuiža estate were they were based.

On the 22nd the Estonians counter attacked at the village of Starte. The road into the village emerged from woodland and then through about 500m of open farmland before entering the village. All of this was well covered by machine guns from the defenders and the company attacking made very slow progress down drainage ditches. Suddenly, the "Vanapagan" dashed full tilt down the road into the village, firing as it went, the Estonians lept to their feet and charged the village, and it was taken. Unfortunately the "Vanapagan" could not follow up the pursuit as it was running low in fuel.

By the 25th the “Vanapagan” needed essential maintenance, and the "Estonia" had serious mechanical problems, but the “Toonela” was stationed on the Riga-Pskov highway guarding the bridge at Cesis.

ii) Einar Lundborg

Einar Lundborg and the "Kalevipoeg"

Einar Lundourg was one of those people who are natural adventurers. He had been in the Swedish army before resigning to join a Swedish volunteer brigade, helping the Finns in their fight for independence against the Russians. He did well there, but when the war was won he returned to Sweden and joined the 5th Hussars. This seemed to bore him rather, so when an office opened in Stockhom recruiting for the Estonian war of Independence he volunteered. By March 1919 he was with other Swedish volunteers, the Svenska Karen, at the battle of Narva.

In April a number of armoured cars became available, and Lundborg was chosen to captain the "Kalevipoeg", setting off for the Southern front.

On May 25th, Lundberg was with the Estonians when they took Pskov, the highwater mark of their advance. The "Kalevipoeg" cleared the way for the attack into the town, and Lundborg was later known as the "King of Pskov".

In September the "Kalevipoeg" was part of August Nieländer's armoured car squadron when it temporarily turned away from the main column, leaving them unprotected from Bolshevik attacks. This seems to have given rise to some bitterness in the infantry, so that shortly afterwards Lundborg found himself without infantry support during a five and and half hour battle, losing 5 of his men. He was only rescued when the "Pishund" appeared and drove the enemy off.

Disillusioned, Lundberg resigned and joined the Swedish White Legion with the White Russian forces at Narva, but something there did not suit him either, and by November he was back in Sweden. Lundborg went on to be a pilot, earning fame for the rescue to Umberto Noble when his airship crashed in the Artic, and in the end dying flying as a test pilot in 1931.

The Black Army of Nestor Makhno

The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian and Russian empires left a vacuum which many peoples tried to fill. For the historic kingdom of Ukraine, split between the the Russians and Austrians, this was a heaven sent opportunity. Unfortunately, hundreds of years in different worlds had left little in common between the two parts, who fielded two separate armies, and were defeated and absorbed separately, by the Poles and Russians. But there was, for a while, a third force, the Black Army, or Revolutionary Insurrectionary Army of Ukraine.

The RIAU was led by Nestor Makhno (hence they were sometimes known as Makhnovists) the son of a very poor family who had worked in a iron foundry in Huliaipol, where he had first got involved in Anarchist politics. He eventually rose to command all the Anarchist groups in South Eastern Ukraine, where he tried to impose an Anarchist/ Communist society, abolishing capitalism, "nationalising" all land and setting up workers communes, though, strangely enough, most of the senior leaders seemed to come from Makhnos forces. In true Communist style Makhno adopted a nickname, "Batko", meaning Father.

Mostly though the RIAU fought, against White Russians, Red Russians, anybody really. To distinguish them from the White and Reds, and because they marched under the black Anarchist flag, they were known as the Black Army. In 1918 Makhno swiftly won victories against the much larger forces of the Hetmanate - the client state set up in Ukraine by Germany and Austro-Hungary - capturing vast amounts of supplies, and encouraging many Ukrainian peasants to join his cause.

By early 1919 Makhno had 15,000 men, mainly Ukrainian and Cossack peasants, equipped from the hundreds of thousands of Austrian and German soldiers streaming back through the Ukraine from the Eastern front. From the outside they didn't look too different from other armies of the time, with infantry, cavalry and artillery. The cavalry, both regular and guerrilla, was reportedly very good. Two things set the RIAU apart. Firstly, there were no officers as such, all commanders were elected by the troops, and major decisions taken by mass assemblies. Although ideologically pure in the anarchist sense, it was also responding to necessity. The Austro Hungarian army had had very few Ukrainian officers, and they were unlikely to join an Anarchist militia when there were White forces available. In contrast, the Polish forces for example, could draw on a large cadre of trained ex-Austrian officers, especially in the cavalry.

A tachanka and RIAU cavalry

The second distinctive feature was the tachanka. This was a two horse cart with a driver and one or two soldiers in the back, with a rear facing heavy machine gun. Again this suited well the local conditions, where the warfare was mobile and cavalry important, this gave the cavalry extra fire power, as well as covering the retreat, as the machine gun faced backwards. The RIAU used them en mass and it made a big impression on their enemies. Of course tachankas could also be used to transport infantry, much faster than marching.

Events in deepest Ukraine tended to be ignored in the Western press, one of few mentions of Makho concerns an interview in July 1919 with General Gregoriev, who had set up an independent republic in Odessa on the Black Sea, and who was associated with the "Green" army. Makhno and Gregoriev were, superficially, allies. Anyway, suspecting that he was going to defect to the Whites (highly likely given Gregoriev's numerous changes of side in the past), Makhno drew a pistol, and shot him.

 A tachanka and cavalry

The Black army had a number of successes, especially against the Whites of Admiral Denikin, but it was the Bolsheviks who were their downfall. Makhno's brand of Anarchism was a mixture of brutality and naivety, so that when a unit was captured the officers would be executed, but the troops often released to walk home as "proletarian brothers". Thus, although detesting the Cheka secret police, and the Bolshevik dictation of its subjects lives, Makhno regarded the Reds as natural allies. He was, inevitably, betrayed in June 1920 when Red units suddenly attacked various RIAU outposts, Trotsky ordered the Cheka to murder thousands of Ukrainian peasants sympathetic to the Anarchist cause, and two Cheka agents were sent to assassinate Makhno. Even then, when in the Communists offered another alliance in September 1920 Makhno agreed, and campaigned against the White General Wrangel, preventing the Ukrainian grain harvest from falling into White hands.

"STEADFAST TO 'THE END, WRANGEL'S LAST DAYS IN TIE CRIMEA, The following is the substance of an  Oficial Report, published in the London "Times" of December 10 1920, on the evacuation of the Crimea by Lieutenant-Colonel Count Leon Ostrorog, an eye-witness and competent observer of the incidents he describes:- Having proceeded to the Crinea from Warsaw in the latter part of October on my own initiative with a view to ascertaining what assistance, if any, could be rendered to Wrangel's Army, I was an eye witness of the last scenes of the retreat and evacuation of both the Army and civil population, which commenced on November 11. 

Some days previous to that date an unprecedented cold wave had struck the peninsula, accompanied by a fierce norfherlv gale. The plight of Wrangel's Army, for the greater part in rags, shoeless, on short rations, lacking stores of every kind, with a scanty medical service, beggars imagination; in addition, munitions were scarce and artillery practically nil. This Army, composed of units of every description. though chiefly of Don and Kuba Cossacks, was flanked by Makhno's partisan bands on its' extreme right. The total fighting strength, infantry, cavalry and artillery, numbered originally 100,000 men, officers, rank, and file, on the Mariupol, Alexandrovsk, Aleshki. Kherson front-namely, 500 kilometeres (310 miles). It had fought without a break for over six months against vastly superior forces well armed, equipped, and fed, with a great superiority, not only in artillery and  ordnance, but ammunition as well, the Bolshevists being well supplied with both shell and fuses of the latest pattern. The heavy casualties among officers of high rank testify to the fierceness of the fighting, while, owing to lack of sea transport and the immense difficulty of communications for such as wished to join Wrangel's Army the General's reserves were reduced to nil. Nevertheless, this battered Army stood its ground in spite of the overwhelming forces which poured against it from the opening of the Polish-Soviet peace negotiations, until the effectives were reduced to 45,000 men, forming three divisions, against 28 Red divisions. This took place on October 28, and 10 days' continuous battle was followed by the retreat to the Perekop line. 

 RIAU troops

General Wrangel, besides directing operations, maintainnmg order among the population by his indomitable courage and personality, led in person many of the attacks against the Bolshevists, still hoping against hope that a hitch might occur during the. Polish Soviet peace negotiations, thus causing the withdrawal of some of the Bolshevist forces, and give time for supplies to reach him. His spirit and that of his troops never broke down. The last offensive; which had begun on October 28, ended on November 14, when Sebastopol fell. No words can describe the superb spirit of the inhabitants, as well as that of the few troops in Sebastopol. when it was announced officially that all hope was at an end, and that evacuation must commence at once. There was no panic, no looting, no disorder; absolute calm prevailed. When it is realised that officers' wives, delicate women, and children had been living for days on end in a city practically devoid of fuel, with Arctic cold, scanty food, ill-clothed, ill-lodged, cut off from and apparently abandoned by the outer world, one can but bow to such heroism, and see in its spirit the certain regeneration and ultimate grandeur of the Russian peoples."

 Two weeks after Wrangel's defeat in November 1920 Mahkno's headquarters staff met the Red Army command for a planning meeting, and were murdered. The Black army never really recovered, their best leaders gone and the peasants in the Ukraine cowed by Trotskys campaign of terror. In August 1921 Makhno slipped across the Romanian border to exile, finally in Paris where he worked amongst other things, as a stage hand at the Paris Opera.