It was soon clear that the camp at Wano was a hostile environment, and the camp was fired on nightly.
" On the evening of the 28th the Commissioner informed me that , a gathering of some 800 Mahsud Waziris under the leadership of a fanatical Mulla named Powindah, were reported to have collected at Kaniguram and were about to move into the Khaisara Valley, where they might possibly be increased to 1,000 or 2,000 men".
On October 30th Turner sent out a reconnaissance expedition 10 miles towards Khaisara, but they found nothing, although they were shot at on the return. It was quite a strong force in it's own right;
1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry, 12 sabres; No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, 2 guns, 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 250 rifles , 3rd regiment of Sikh Infantry, 250 rifles.
On November 2nd news arrived that Powindah had arrived at Khaisara with about 1,000 men. Turner doubled the piquets outside the camp, and strengthened the "weak points" with earthworks. It could be asked why "weak points" had not been strengthened before. He did however send a reconnaissance force 6 1/2 miles towards Khaisara, but they only found a small party of waziris, who fired on them but were driven off.
The night of 2nd November
"The night passed quietly until 5.30 on the morning of the 3rd when, the whole camp was suddenly aroused by hearing three shots followed by wild yells and the beating of drums, and at the same instant a desperate rush of some 500 determined fanatics supported by a heavy fire from the right front was made straight into, the left flank and left, rear of camp. So rapid was the rush that before the Gurkhas, although already accoutred, could get out of their tents, the leading men, had penetrated into their camp, and some 30 of them had passed beyond into the rear of the field hospitals, commissariat, and cavalry. The Gurkhas, though thus taken by surprise, and getting out of their tents only to find their camp in possession of the enemy, quickly formed rallying bodies and engaged in a desperate hand-to- hand conflict with the enemy, but so dark was the night that friend was undistinguishable from foe at even two or three paces distance."
"It appears that undercover of this darkness, the enemy had approached camp from the west along the two large ravines. Emerging from these, the main body rushed past Nos. 9 and 10 picquets. In the latter, which was held by seven men, three were killed, and the others after firing three shots made their escape. It was these shots that gave the first alarm of the enemy's approach. A large body of Waziris who had continued their course down the ravine past No. 9 picquet were checked on reaching the left support of the Gurkhas and split up into two bodies, one of which joined the main attack on the left flank of the Gurkhas, and the other continuing down the ravine broke up against the rear guards, many penetrating into camp behind the field hospitals and the commissariat, where they succeeded in inflicting much damage on the unarmed followers and transport animals. Some of these men, joined by others who had penetrated down the main street, succeeded in reaching the cavalry lines and even as far as the brigade staff tents. Those in the cavalry lines set to work hacking at the heel ropes of the troop horses with the apparent object of causing a stampede. A number of horses were thus set free and galloped out of camp. By some of these also it was that Lieutenant Macaulay, R.E., who was apparently making his way towards the sound of the firing, was set on and killed by swordcuts but however, before he had shot one man dead and another through the body with his revolver. Surgeon- Major Haig was also attacked by a swordsman when coming out of his tent, and received a cut through the upper part of the arm, completely severing the bone. In the field hospitals three of the enemy were shot dead by some of the sick, whilst two of the latter were wounded,, one by a gunshot and the other by a swordcut.
"In the meantime, the Gurkhas had stopped the main rush from passing down the centre street. The reserve, of the regiment, under Major Robinson formed a rallying square in the centre of their camp and fought back-to-back and hand-to-hand. Here, among others, the Jemadar Adjutant of the regiment was killed, and Captain Lang and Lieutenant Angelo were wounded, the former severely, and the latter dangerously. Desperate fighting also took, place in the breast-work at the north-west corner of the camp, where Lieutenant Herbert was dangerously. wounded, and some nine men either killed or wounded".
"When it became apparent that the enemy's main attack was directed against the left flank of the camp, I ordered Colonel Meiklejohn, C.M.G., Commanding the 20th Bengal Infantry, to take two companies of his regiment, which were in reserve, to reinforce the Gurkhas. This he did, clearing the way as he went with the bayonet. I also ordered a company of the 3rd Sikhs to join and assist the Gurkhas. By the time these reinforcements reached our left, flank, the Gurkhas had succeeded in completely clearing their camp of the enemy who left behind them some forty bodies. After, the main attack had been repulsed, two other separate but far less determined attempts were made by the enemy to get home from the same direction, but were steadily met, Orders were given for the guns to fire star shell to light up the ground where the enemy were collected, and this enabled the infantry to get in several effective volleys. There still remained a few stray men in the centre of the camp, who, while the fighting was going on, had employed themselves in looting whatever they could lay their hands on. These, finding their friends had failed to hold their ground, turned their thoughts to flight. Several were shot down while attempting to flee, and indeed it is doubtful if any of those who had delayed making their escape till the end of the fight succeeded in getting out of camp at all".
"I would here mention that, although the main attack was directed against our left flank, men were observed in large numbers on the hills on our right, apparently awaiting events. A considerable body was also seen to our front, and it was subsequently reported that it was part of the enemy's plan to assault from this direction simultaneously with the attack on our left, but for some reason not explained this did not come off. There is no doubt, however, that had the first attack not been so speedily met and dealt with, the Waziris were ready to take advantage of any confusion, and would have tried to rush the camp from all sides. I had therefore up to the last to be prepared for a second and perhaps more formidable attack from some other quarter".
"At 6 A.M., when day was beginning to dawn, the enemy's fire slackened, and it was apparent that their retreat had commenced. I at once sent orders for the cavalry to start in pursuit and inflict as much damage as possible. There was some slight delay in this order being carried out, as during the fight, whilst the sowars were engaged in defending their front and rear, the syces who should have been saddling the horses had run away and hidden themselves, which could hardly be wondered at, considering that the enemy, as already stated, had succeeded in getting among the horses. In spite of these difficulties, the squadron numbering sixty-one sabres under Major O'Mealy, within ten minutes of receiving the order, was trotting to the right flank of the camp with the object of gaining the road to the Inzar Kotal which was apparently the direction of the enemy's retreat. The cavalry was followed almost immediately by (No.3 (Peshawar) Mountain battery, 4 guns; No.2 Company. Bengal Sappers and Miners, 140 rifles; 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, 349 rifles ; 20th (the Duke of Cambridge's Own) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 200 rifles) under the command of Colonel Meiklejohn, 20th Bengal Infantry, whom I had ordered to push on as rapidly as possible in the direction of the Inzar Kotal and pursue as long as there was any chance of inflicting loss"
"The cavalry, after trotting about three miles, came in sight of the retreating enemy, the main body of whom they estimate to number some 1,000 or 1,500 men. Here the ground was very broken and covered with large stones, and it was impossible to go faster than a trot. On gaining slightly better ground, the squadron cut into the line of the enemy's retreat, and charged where the crowd was thickest, inflicting great loss. After pursuing some distance, the squadron was re-formed under a fire from both sides and again charged where the enemy was thickest. By this time the Waziris were so scattered and the ground so bad, that " pursue " was ordered, and the enemy was cut down or speared singly, the lance proving its excellence as a weapon of pursuit."
"The cavalry horses were beginning to tire, so, rallying for a last effort, the squadron charged up a steep slope among olive trees at the last of the enemy within reach. The ground being now quite impracticable for mounted action, sections were dismounted and the retreat harassed by volleys as long as within range. The squadron then retired until it met the main body of the pursuing column which had been joined about two miles from camp by the 100 rifles of the 1st Gurkhas, who had held the deserted Danveshkhel fort already mentioned."
"On being met by the cavalry Colonel Meiklejohn pushed on with the whole force to the Inzar Kotal and continued the pursuit for some time miles down the. other side. The enemy were seen in full retreat, streaming away towards Shakai on the left and Khaisara on the right, but too far off for the guns to be brought into action. Smaller bodies, however, came under the fire of the infantry and suffered loss. As further pursuit would now have been useless the order was given to retire to the Inzar Kotal, and from there the whole pursuing force returned to camp, which was reached at 4 P.M".
In total British losses were 45 killed, and 75 wounded, including camp followers. Waziri losses were estimated at 350 killed, including 50 during the cavalry pursuit. A rough estimate of total enemy forces came to 3,000, although as mentioned above, only about half that rushed the camp. Of these, Turner divides them into two groups. Firstly, the followers of Mullah Powindah the "fanatical element" whose "bravery and disregard of death" "can only be spoken of in terms of the highest admiration". And secondly, the Nana Khel, including the Abdul Rahman Khel, who were principally bent on plunder (Rs. 2,600 in cash was later found to have been taken from the Commissariat Agent's treasure chest).
"I would especially desire to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the conduct of all corps on this occasion. The brunt of the fighting fell on the 1st Gurkhas. This regiment, although taken at a disadvantage, behaved with the utmost gallantry and steadiness and succeeded after severe hand-to-hand fighting in clearing their camp of the enemy. The whole of the troops displayed excellent discipline, and a noticeable feature of the fight was the perfect order and absence of all confusion in the camp under very trying circumstances ; there was little wild firing, and in the parts of the camp, not directly attacked, there was no firing at imaginary enemies. The manner in which the pursuit was carried out was also most commendable".
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