Action on the North West Frontier, Part 2

It was soon clear that the camp at Wano was a hostile environment, and the camp was fired on nightly. 

" On the evening of the 28th the Commissioner informed me that , a gathering of some 800 Mahsud Waziris under the leadership of a fanatical Mulla named Powindah, were reported to have collected at Kaniguram and were about to move into the Khaisara Valley, where they might possibly be increased to 1,000 or 2,000 men". 

On October 30th Turner sent out a reconnaissance expedition 10 miles towards Khaisara, but they found nothing, although they were shot at on the return. It was quite a strong force in it's own right;

1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry, 12 sabres; No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, 2 guns,  1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 250 rifles , 3rd regiment of Sikh Infantry, 250 rifles. 

On November 2nd news arrived that Powindah had arrived at Khaisara with about 1,000 men. Turner doubled the piquets outside the camp, and strengthened the "weak points" with earthworks. It could be asked why "weak points" had not been strengthened before. He did however send a reconnaissance force 6 1/2 miles towards Khaisara, but they only found a small party of waziris, who fired on them but were driven off. 

The night of 2nd November

"The night passed quietly until 5.30 on the morning of the 3rd when, the whole camp was suddenly aroused by hearing three shots followed by wild yells and the beating of drums, and at the same instant a desperate rush of some 500 determined fanatics supported by a heavy fire from the right front was made straight into, the left flank and left, rear of camp. So rapid was the rush that before the Gurkhas, although already accoutred, could get out of their tents, the leading men, had penetrated into their camp, and some 30 of them had passed beyond into the rear of the field hospitals, commissariat, and cavalry. The Gurkhas, though thus taken by surprise, and  getting out of their tents only to find their camp in possession of the enemy, quickly formed rallying bodies and engaged in a desperate hand-to- hand conflict with the enemy, but so dark was the night that friend was undistinguishable from foe at even two or three paces distance."

"It appears that undercover of this darkness, the enemy had approached camp from the west along the two large ravines. Emerging from these, the main body rushed past Nos. 9 and 10 picquets. In the latter, which was held by seven men, three were killed, and the others  after firing three shots made their escape. It was these shots that gave the first alarm of the  enemy's approach. A large body of Waziris who had continued their course down the ravine  past No. 9 picquet were checked on reaching the left support of the Gurkhas and split up into two bodies, one of which joined the main attack on the left flank of the Gurkhas, and the other continuing down the ravine broke up against the rear guards, many penetrating into camp behind the field hospitals and the commissariat, where they succeeded in inflicting much damage on the unarmed followers and transport animals. Some of these men, joined by others who had penetrated down the main street, succeeded in reaching the cavalry lines and even as far as the brigade staff tents. Those in the cavalry lines set to work hacking at the heel ropes of the troop horses with the apparent object of causing a stampede. A number of horses were thus set free and galloped out of camp. By some of these also it was that Lieutenant Macaulay, R.E., who was apparently making his way towards the sound of the firing, was set on and killed by swordcuts but however, before he had shot one man dead and another through the body with his revolver. Surgeon- Major Haig was also attacked by a swordsman when coming out of his tent, and received a cut through the upper part of the arm, completely severing the bone. In the field hospitals three of the enemy were shot dead by some of the sick, whilst two of the latter were wounded,, one by a gunshot and the other by a swordcut.

"In the meantime, the Gurkhas had stopped the main rush from passing down the centre street. The reserve, of the regiment, under Major Robinson formed a rallying square in the centre of their camp and fought back-to-back and hand-to-hand. Here, among others, the Jemadar Adjutant of the regiment was killed, and Captain Lang and Lieutenant Angelo were wounded, the former severely, and the latter dangerously. Desperate fighting also took, place in the breast-work at the north-west corner of the camp, where Lieutenant Herbert was dangerously. wounded, and some nine men either killed or wounded".

"When it became apparent that the enemy's main attack was directed against the left flank of the camp, I ordered Colonel Meiklejohn, C.M.G., Commanding the 20th Bengal Infantry, to take two companies of his regiment, which were in reserve, to reinforce the Gurkhas. This he did, clearing the way as he went with the bayonet. I also ordered a company of the 3rd Sikhs to join and assist the Gurkhas. By the time these reinforcements reached our left, flank, the Gurkhas had succeeded in completely clearing their camp of the enemy who left behind them some forty bodies. After, the main attack had been repulsed, two other separate but far less determined attempts were made by the enemy to get home from the same direction, but were steadily met, Orders were given for the guns to fire star shell to light up the ground where the enemy were collected, and this enabled the infantry to get in several effective volleys. There still remained a few stray men in the centre of the camp, who, while the fighting was going on, had employed themselves in looting whatever they could lay their hands on. These, finding their friends had failed to hold their ground, turned their thoughts to flight. Several were shot down while attempting to flee, and indeed it is doubtful if any of those who had delayed making their escape till the end of the fight succeeded in getting out of camp at all".

"I would here mention that, although the main attack was directed against our left flank, men were observed in large numbers on the hills on our right, apparently awaiting events. A considerable body was also seen to our front, and it was subsequently reported that it was part of the enemy's plan to assault from this direction simultaneously with the attack on our left, but for some reason not explained this did not come off. There is no doubt, however, that had the first attack not been so speedily met and dealt with, the Waziris were ready to take advantage of any confusion, and would have tried to rush the camp from all sides. I had therefore up to the last to be prepared for a second and perhaps more formidable attack from some other quarter".

"At 6 A.M., when day was beginning to dawn, the enemy's fire slackened, and it was apparent that their retreat had commenced. I at once sent orders for the cavalry to start in pursuit and inflict as much damage as possible. There was some slight delay in this order being carried out, as during the fight, whilst the sowars were engaged in defending their front and rear, the syces who should have been saddling the horses had run away and hidden themselves, which could hardly be wondered at, considering that the enemy, as already stated, had succeeded in getting among the horses. In spite of these difficulties, the squadron numbering sixty-one sabres under Major O'Mealy, within ten minutes of receiving the order, was trotting to the right flank of the camp with the object of gaining the road to the Inzar Kotal which was apparently the direction of the enemy's retreat. The cavalry was followed almost immediately by (No.3 (Peshawar) Mountain battery, 4 guns; No.2 Company. Bengal Sappers and Miners, 140 rifles; 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, 349 rifles ; 20th (the Duke of Cambridge's Own) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 200 rifles) under the command of Colonel Meiklejohn, 20th Bengal Infantry, whom I had ordered to push on as rapidly as possible in the direction of the Inzar Kotal and pursue as long as there was any chance of inflicting loss"

"The cavalry, after trotting about three miles, came in sight of the retreating enemy, the main body of whom they estimate to number some 1,000 or 1,500 men. Here the ground was very broken and covered with large stones, and it was impossible to go faster than a trot. On gaining slightly better ground, the squadron cut into the line of the enemy's retreat, and charged where the crowd was thickest, inflicting great loss. After pursuing some distance, the squadron was re-formed under a fire from both sides and again charged where the enemy was thickest. By this time the Waziris were so scattered and the ground so bad, that " pursue " was ordered, and the enemy was cut down or speared singly, the lance proving its excellence as a weapon of pursuit." 

"The cavalry horses were beginning to tire, so, rallying for a last effort, the squadron charged up a steep slope among olive trees at the last of the enemy within reach. The ground being now quite impracticable for mounted action, sections were dismounted and the retreat harassed by volleys as long as within range. The squadron then retired until it met the main body of the pursuing column which had been joined about two miles from camp by the 100 rifles of the 1st Gurkhas, who had held the deserted Danveshkhel fort already mentioned."

"On being met by the cavalry Colonel Meiklejohn pushed on with the whole force to the Inzar Kotal and continued the pursuit for some time miles down the. other side. The enemy were seen in full retreat, streaming away towards Shakai on the left and Khaisara on the right, but too far off for the guns to be brought into action. Smaller bodies, however, came under the fire of the infantry and suffered loss. As further pursuit would now have been useless the order was given to retire to the Inzar Kotal, and from there the whole pursuing force returned to camp, which was reached at 4 P.M".

In total British losses were 45 killed, and 75 wounded, including camp followers. Waziri losses were estimated at 350 killed, including 50 during the cavalry pursuit. A rough estimate of total enemy forces came to 3,000, although as mentioned above, only about half that rushed the camp. Of these, Turner divides them into two groups. Firstly, the followers of Mullah Powindah the "fanatical element" whose "bravery and disregard of death" "can only be spoken of in terms of the highest admiration". And secondly, the Nana Khel, including the Abdul Rahman Khel, who were principally bent on plunder (Rs. 2,600 in cash was later found to have been taken from the Commissariat Agent's treasure chest). 

"I would especially desire to bring to the notice of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief the conduct of all corps on this occasion. The brunt of the fighting fell on the 1st Gurkhas. This regiment, although taken at a disadvantage, behaved with the utmost gallantry and steadiness and succeeded after severe hand-to-hand fighting in clearing their camp of the enemy. The whole of the troops displayed excellent discipline, and a noticeable feature of the fight was the perfect order and absence of all confusion in the camp under very trying circumstances ; there was little wild firing, and in the parts of the camp, not directly attacked, there was no firing at imaginary enemies. The manner in which the pursuit was carried out was also most commendable".

Action on the Northwest Frontier - Wano, 1894. Part 1

Background

The Waziristan Delineation Escort arose from the treaty of 1893 defining the frontier between British India and Afghanistan, the "Durand Line". The region on the British side had in fact been "British" in name only, and several punitive raids had been mounted to punish Pushtan tribes for attacking Indian settlements further south. By the 1890s, the British felt strong enough to establish proper control of the area, and in 1901 the region was formed into a new province, the North West Frontier. 

Of course, it was not quite as easy as that, and in 1894 a military force was send to the Waziristan area. Unlike the previous expeditions, this mission had both political and military aspects, and therefore political and military leaders. It will probably come as no surprise that this was to cause problems. The following, from The London Gazette of June 14 1895, is the report of the military commander, Brigadier-General A. H. Turner. 

To Wano

The troops assembled at Dera Ismail, and was ready by the 1st of October. It was quite a strong, well balanced expedition, though with hindsight perhaps not strong enough.

Squadron; 1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry  129 men

No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery (6 guns)                         265 men

No. 2 Company Bengal Sappers and Miners                          191 men

1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment                             748 men

3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry                                                744 men

20th Regiment of Bengal Infantry                                          740 men

(the infantry armed with Martini-Henry rifles, the cavalry with Martini-Henry carbines and lances)

Turner did not leave however until the 11th, due to "political considerations" as he rather pointedly puts it. By the 18th they had reached Kajuri Kach where they were joined by members of the Delineation Commission. On the 22nd the whole force, minus the 20th Bengals left to safeguard supplies, set out for Wano (modern day Wanna), which they reached, after extensive reconnaissance, on the 24th. They were joined by the 20th Bengals, and further supplies, on the 27th. 

The Camp at Wano

"Wano is a large open plain, for the most part stony, about 13 miles long by 11 miles broad.

The only running stream is the Toi which skirts the southern and south-eastern edge of the plain, and along the banks of which-there is a narrow strip of cultivation surrounding the villages and forts of the Ahmadzai Darweshkhel Waziris."

A camp was established on the plain, as seen below. 

 "The country in our vicinity, as indeed all over the Wano plain, is intersected by ravines in every direction. A ravine runs along the whole front and another along the rear, from which latter the drinking water is obtained. These ravines are both tributaries of the Toi which here runs from south to north, and is not more than 300 yards distant from the east end of the civil camp. Beyond the Toi rise some high hills, out of range except for arms of precision. About 400 yards in rear of the camp, is a small rocky ridge with two peaks rising some 75 feet out of the plain ; this is known as the " Picquet Hill." 

"The whole camp was surrounded by a chain of observation picquets, and the position of these and also of their supports on the night of the 2nd-3rd November is shown in the sketch. It had been found that patrolling at night was useless owing to the noise made by our men moving over the stony ground, which indicated their position, and rendered them liable to be surprised and cut off by small parties. The picquets, were posted with the object merely of observing and reporting, and were not intended to hold their own in the event of a serious attack, in which case they were ordered, after giving the alarm, to fall back on their supports, the latter then retiring on the main body. To have had all picquets strong enough to offer resistance to an attack in force would have made night duty fall very heavy.

"The positions for the picquets were chosen chiefly with the object of watching the ravines in the vicinity of the camp. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 picquets were furnished by the 3rd Sikhs. The 1st Gurkhas furnished the picquets on the left flank, viz., 8, 9, 10, the "Bogey," and 11. The " Bogey " picquet was so called because it was only occasionally held, but on the night of the 2nd-3rd it was occupied. No. 12 was furnished by the 20th Bengal Infantry and had a support in rear, on which it was ordered to fall".

 "To the north-east of. camp and about 500 yards distant, there is a deserted Danveshkhel fort, and this on the night of the 2nd-3rd was occupied by 100 rifles of the 1st Gurkhas, with orders to remain concealed, and if an attempt on camp were made in that direction, they were to attack the enemy in rear. If the attack were made on the left of camp, they were to try and cut off any body of the enemy retreating by the Toi valley.

The above brief description of our dispositions will help to explain the events that followed. It may also here be mentioned that the moon was in its first quarter and went down about ten o'clock pm the evening of the 2nd". 

 Actually there were two camps. "The civil camp was pitched separately about 100 yards to the right rear of the 3rd Sikhs. This was a source of great anxiety to me, but I consented to this arrangement on the urgent representation of the British Commissioner, who considered that it was  necessary on political grounds, as allowing free access to him by jirgas".

The siting of the camp was crucial to what was to follow, and came in for some criticism later. Turner in his report seems well aware of this, and is distinctly defensive.

" It may here be mentioned that the position of the camp had been chosen chiefly on political considerations, as the British-Commissioner had urged most strongly that the force should remain at the eastern end of the valley, so as to cover the main passes into the Mahsud country, namely, the Tiarza and the Inzar, already mentioned.  The political officers up to the end of October were fully persuaded that we need anticipate no strong combination among the Mahsuds to molest us, but that we should be prepared for raids or annoyance from small bands. The camp was therefore pitched somewhat more extended for sanitary reasons than it would have been in a purely military expedition". 

The political officers were to be proved wrong .......

Part 2. Aftermath - the "Battle" of Colnbrook and the Irish Alarm

From " A tour thro' the whole island of Great Britain", by Daniel Defoe, published in 1726. Note that although Defoe describes both Colebrook and Coltbrook, he is presumably referring to modern day Colnbrook. Colnbrook was on the main London to Bath road, and 100 years earlier in 1577 had been recorded as having 10 coaching inns.

William landing in England

"I cannot omit to observe one thing here, to which I was an eye-witness, and which will resolve a difficulty that to this day has puzzled the understandings of a great many people, if not of the whole nation; namely, That here began the universal alarm that spread over the whole kingdom (almost at the same time) of the Irish being coming to cut every bodies throats: 

The brief account of which, because it has something curious in it, I believe will be agreeable to you. The state of it is thus: 

As the terror which the threatnings of these Irishmen had brought upon the whole town of Reading, obliged the magistrates, and chief of the inhabitants, to apply to the Prince of Orange's army for immediate help, so you cannot doubt, but that many of the inhabitants fled for their lives by all the ways that they could; and this was chiefly in the night; for in the day, the soldiers, who had their eyes every where, stopped them, and would not permit them to stir, which still increased their terror. 

Those that got away, you may be sure, were in the utmost fright and amazement, and they had nothing less in their mouths, but that the Irish would (and by that time had) burnt the town, and cut the throats of all the people, men, women, and children. I was then at Windsor, and in the very interval of all this fright, King James being gone, and the army retreated from Salisbury, the Lord Feversham calls the troops together, and causing them to lay down their arms, disbands them, and gives them leave, every man, to go whither they would. 

The Irish dragoons, which had fled from Reading, rallied at Twyford, and having not lost many of their number (for there were not above twelve men killed) they marched on for Maidenhead, swearing, and cursing, after most soldierly a manner, that they would burn all the towns where-ever they came, and cut the throats of all the people. However, whether it was, that they thought themselves too near the Dutch at Maidenhead, or what else was the matter, they did not offer to take quarters at Maidenhead, the town also being full of King James's troops, so they marched on for Colebrook, blustering in the same manner, of what they would do when they came there. 

The town of Colebrook had notice of their coming, and how they had publickly threatened to burn the town, and murther all the people; but, happily for them, they had quartered there a regiment of Scots foot, of those regiments which King James had caused to march from Scotland to his aid on this occasion; and they had with them, as was the usage of all the foot in those times, two pieces of cannon, that is to say, field-pieces, and they stood just in the market-place, pointing westward to the street where these gentlemen were to come. 

The people of Colebrook applied immediately to the Scots colonel, whose name I am very sorry I cannot remember, because it is to his honour that I should mention it, and begged his protection. The colonel calling together a council of his officers, immediately resolved, they would make good their quarters, unless they received orders from their superior officers to quit them, and that they would defend the town from plunder; and upon this, immediately the drums beat to arms, and the regiment came together in a few moments: It was in the depth of winter, and, by consequence, was night, and being a wet day, the evening was exceeding dark, when some advanced centinels gave notice, that they heard the drums beat the dragoons march, at some distance upon the road. 

Upon this the colonel ordered a lieutenant, with thirty musqueteers, to make an advanced guard at the extreme part of the town, and he was supported by another party of forty men, most pikes, at a small distance, who were to advance upon a signal; and if these last should ingage, the drums of the whole regiment were to beat a march, and half the battalion, to advance with the two pieces of cannon. 

It was near ten a clock at night before the dragoons reached the town, when the two advanced dragoons, which, by the discipline at that time, always rode at a distance from the regiment, were challenged by the centinels placed by the lieutenant, as above; upon which they gave notice to the regiment, who immediately halted, and an officer, with some dragoons (they could not tell how many, because it was dark) came up, and demanded, Who they were that challenged? the centinel called his corporal, and he the serjeant, with three files of musqueteers, and they told the officer what regiment they belonged to, and that they had orders to stop any troops from entering the town, 'till their colonel should be acquainted with it, and give farther orders. 

The dragoons, as the ground would admit, drew up in front, and their officers began to huff and threaten, that they were the king's troops, and within the line of the army; that they must have quarters in the town, and ought not to be refused by their own side. 

By this time the lieutenant came up also: He gave the officer of dragoons very good words, and told him, He knew too well what belonged to the duty of a subaltern officer, to blame him for doing his duty; but that the regiment was under arms, and the colonel at the head of them in the market-house, and he would immediately send to him for orders, and doubted not, but that the colonel would give them quarters in the town. The dragoons, not satisfied with this civil usage, threatened, swore, rag'd, and damning the colonel, and the regiment, though not present, said they would have quarters without asking leave of any man, and the officer turning about to a sergeant, bid him go back, and cause the regiment to advance.

The lieutenant told him calmly, He was sorry to see him act so; but if that was his resolution, he was ready for him, and immediately called out to his sergeant to give the signal to the next party to advance, and told the officer of dragoons, that if he stirred one foot forward, or any of his men, he would fire upon them immediately. The forty men advanced, and in two minutes after, they could hear the drums of the regiment beat the Scots march. 

Upon this, the dragoons halted again, and the major of the dragoons advancing to the parlee, the lieutenant colonel of the foot, was also come up to the lieutenant's party, with the forty men, and with the colonel's answer to the demand of quarters; namely, That if the dragoons had any orders in writing from the general for quartering in the town, or for marching that way, he was very ready to give them admittance; but if not, they were his quarters, and he would defend them to the last man, and no-body should come in there, especially at that time of night. 

The dragoons, however, insulted and menac'd the major also, and that at such a rate, that he gave orders immediately to acquaint the colonel of it, who instantly advanced, in full march, with the whole regiment, having about one hundred links lighted to let them see the way, the night being exceeding dark. 

When the dragoons saw this, and having no stomach to engage, they desisted; but raged and stormed at such a rate, as I cannot express, and taking the road to Stanes, swore, they would go thither, and burn the town, and kill man, woman and child. 

Those blusters were so loud, and the fellows, by nation, such as from whom it might be expected, as put the people of Coltbrook, the fright they had been in for themselves being a little over, into a second concern for their neighbours at Stanes, and some of them shewed the concern to be so real, that they sent express upon express to Stanes, to acquaint the people there of their danger, knowing there was, at that time, only two companies of foot, of Colonel 's regiment, in the town. When these messengers came there, they found the people already alarmed by others, who had come from the same town of Colebrook, in the first fright, with the news, that the Irish were coming to burn the said town of Colebrook, and that, by that time, they did not question but they had done it, and they were surprized to hear now, that it was not done; but upon the arriving of these messengers, bringing word, that they had burnt Colebrook, but for the assistance of the Scots regiment ; and that they were coming to Stanes, and swore, they would kill man, woman and child; it is impossible to express the consternation of the people: Away they run out of the town, dark, and rainy, and midnight as it was, some to Kingston, some over the heath to Hownslow, and Brentford, some to Egham, and some to Windsor, with the dreadful news; and by that time they reached those places, their fears had turned their story from saying, they would burn and kill, to they had burned and killed, and were coming after you to do the like. 

The same alarm was carried by others from Colebrook to Uxbridge; for thither the dragoons were for marching at first; and thus, some one way, and some another, it spread like the undulations of the water in a pond, when a flat stone is cast upon the surface: From Brentford and Kingston, and from Uxbridge  it came severally, and by different roads, to London, and so, as I may say, all over England; nor is it wonderful, that it seemed to be all over the nation in one day, which was the next after this beginning; Fear gave wings to the news, no post could carry it as it flew from town to town, and still every messenger had two articles with him, i. Not that such and such towns were to be burnt and plundered by them; but that they were already burnt; and that the Irish were at their heels to do the like. 

This, I think, is a clear account of this alarm, and what can be more natural? Colebrook was not the case, for where-ever the Colebrook men came, they were asked, If their town was down? I rode the next morning to Maidenhead: At Slough they told me, Maidenhead was burnt, and Uxbridge, and Reading, and I know not how many more, were destroy'd; and when I came to Reading, they told me, Maidenhead and Okingham were burnt, and the like. From thence I went to Henley, where the Prince of Orange, with the second line of his army, entered that very afternoon, and there they had had the same account, with the news of King James's flight; and thus it spread every way insensibly. The manner is too recent in memory, to need my giving any description of it".

James was already unsure how much support he could really count on in England, only trusting his Irish troops. The willingness of the people of Reading to stand against these troops, and of his Scottish troops to side with the citizens of Colebrook, only convinced him that the situation was lost. On Tuesday 11 December, two days after the battle, he fled. First to Louis IV of France, and then to Ireland, where the Battle of the Boyne ended the campaign.

The Battle of Reading, 9th December 1688 - Part 1

The process which removed the threat of Stuart absolutism, culminating in the victory at Culloden in 1745, began with the "Glorious Revolution" in 1688, where a Dutch army under William of Orange (married to the English princess Mary) was invited to invade England to remove James II. In a story rife with ironies (William was actually deposing his father in law), perhaps the greatest is that the major English battle of the campaign was fought between Dutch and Irish dragoons. It was however fought in, and with the participation of, the English town of Reading. 

James II (National Army museum)

The battle is described below by Daniel Defoe, as part of his " A tour thro' the whole island of Great Britain", published in 1726. Although Defoe could get eye witness accounts, and combine them into a thrilling story, it should be borne in mind that he had been on the Williamite side at the time (actually, his preferences come out quite clearly!).
William has landed, and is advancing on London.......

Newbury 

Here it was that the vanguard, or first line of the Prince of Orange's army, was posted, when the Irish dragoons, who were posted in Reading, finding they should be attacked in a few days, had put the town's people into such a fright, by threatening to burn and plunder the town, and cut all the peoples throats, that they sent express messengers to the Dutch general officer Grave Van Nassau for help; who sent them a detachment of but two hundred and eighty dragoons, though the troops in the town were near seven hundred men. What success they met with, I shall mention presently.

Reading

As I have noted above, it was here that the Dutch with two hundred and eighty horse and dragoons, attacked the forces of the late King James, in aid of the distress'd town's-men, who they threatened to murther and plunder that very day. It was on a Sunday morning, that the Irish dragoons had resolved on the design'd mischief, if they really intended it: In order to it, they posted a guard at the principal church in the piazza there, and might, indeed, easily have locked all the people in, and have cut their throats; also they placed a company of foot in the church-yard of another church, over-against the Bear Inn; so that if they really did not intend to massacre the people, as their officers said they did not, yet that way of posting their men, joyn'd to the loud oaths and protestations, that they would do it, made it look as like such a design, as any thing unexecuted, or unattempted, could do.

In this posture things stood when the Dutch entered the town: The Irish had placed a centinel on the top of the steeple of the great church, with orders, if he saw any troops advance, to fire his piece, and ring the bell; the fellow, being surprised with the sight, for he discovered the Dutch but a little before they reached the town, fired his musquet, but forgot to ring the bell, and came down. However, his firing gave the alarm sufficiently, and the troops in the town, who were all under arms before, whether for the design'd execution, or not, I will not determine; but, I say, being under arms before, they had little more to do, but to post their troops, which they did with skill enough, being commanded by Sir John Lanier, an experienced officer, and colonel of a regiment of horse in Kong James's army; and had the men done their duty, they might easily have repuls'd the few troops that attacked them; but the Dutch entering the town in two places, one by the ordinary road from Newbery, and the other by the Broad Street near where the horse-fair is kept, forc'd both the posts, and entered the market place, where the main body of the Irish troops were drawn up.

St Giles Church

The first party of the Dutch found a company of foot drawn up in the church-yard over-against the Bear Inn, and a troop of dragoons in the Bear Inn yard; the dragoons hearing the Dutch were at hand, their officer bravely drew them out of the inn yard, and faced the Dutch in the open road, the church- yard wall being lined with musquetiers to flank the street; the Dutch, who came on full gallop, fell in upon the dragoons, sword in hand, and with such irresistable fury, that the Irish were immediately put into confusion, and after three or four minutes bearing the charge, they were driven clear out of the street. At the very same instant, another party of the Dutch dragoons, dismounting, entered the church-yard, and the whole body posted there, fled also, with little or no resistance, not
sufficient, indeed, to be called resistance. After this, the dragoons, mounting again, forced their squadrons, and entered the market place.

Here, the troops being numerous, made two or three regular discharges; but finding themselves charged in the rear by the other Dutchmen, who had by this time entered the said Broad Street, they not knowing the strength, or weakness of their enemy, presently broke, and fled by all the ways possible. Sir John Lanier, having a calash and six horses, got away with the first, though he was twice headed by a Dutch trooper, who endeavoured to shoot one of the horses, but miss'd his shot, so the colonel got away.

The Dutch having cleared the town, pursued some of them as far as Twyford, and such was the terror that they were in, that a person, from whom I had this part of the relation, told me, he saw one Dutch trooper chase twelve of the Irish dragoons to the river near Twyford, and ride into the water a good way after them; nor durst Sir John Lanier's regiment of horse, and Sir John Fenwick's, and a third, whose colonel I do not remember, advance to relieve their friends, though they, having had the alarm, stood drawn up on the hill on Twyford side of the river, where they might see by what a contemptible number their numerous party was pursued; for there were not above five and forty, or fifty at most, of the Dutch, that pursued about three hundred of the Irish dragoons to Twyford.

Thus the town of Reading was delivered from the danger they were threatned with, and which they as really expected, as they expected the sun would rise. It is true, the Irish officers denied afterwards, that there was any such design, or that they intended to offer the people any violence; but it is true, that several of their soldiers confess'd it, and gave private intimations of it, to the people in the houses where they quartered, especially some that had been kindly treated in their quarters, and had a little more gratitude and humanity than the rest.